Corporate law and self-regulation by Kershaw, David
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3574201. 
© David Kershaw. Users may download and/or print one copy to facilitate their private study 
or for non-commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of this material 
or use it for any profit-making activities or any other form of commercial gain. 
 
 
 
 
 Corporate Law and Self-Regulation 
 
 
 
David Kershaw 
 
 
 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 5/2015 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Law Department 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Corporate Law and Self-Regulation 
 
 
 
David Kershaw* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the different ways in which market actors are “co-opted” as 
corporate law regulators. It considers the the preconditions for generating “endogenous self-
regulation” through the lens of the formation and operation of the UK Takeover Code and 
Panel. The paper argues that its incontrovertible success as a command, control and 
surveillance regulator is in large part attributable to merchant (investment) banking control 
over the production of the original Code and the ways in which the Code generates direct and 
indirect income opportunities for investment bankers in takeover activity, referred to in the 
paper as “bribing the quarterback”.  The paper also uses the Takeover Panel example to 
explore the unexpected regulatory biases that are generated by the survival and legitimacy 
concerns of the self-regulator itself.  From endogenous self-regulation, the paper moves onto 
consider “market-controlled” regulation where the state directly co-opts market actors as 
regualators. Using the example of “comply or explain” corporate governance codes the paper 
explores the powerful market-based enforcement drivers  and argues that these drivers interact 
with a “comply or explain” regulatory outlook that is likely to, and does, lead to sub-optimal 
regulation that overweights accountability concerns.  Setting these regulatory effects alongside 
the regulatory biases identified in the analysis of the Takeover Code, the paper shows that the 
regulatory biases generated by self-regulation are more muli-faceted than, and often 
inconsistent with, the standard account that self-regulation is likely to generate rules that 
favour the regulated.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Typically when we think about the regulation of corporate and business life we ask 
two questions: why should we regulate; and how should we regulate? The first 
question invokes justifications for interfering with the free contracting process 
amongst corporate actors, both within and outside of the corporation. The second 
question explores whether we should insist on corporations following a particular 
form of behaviour through mandatory rules, or merely provide weighted guidance 
on rule choice through default rules that can be opted-out of. A third question 
relating to corporate regulation is less prominent and is the subject of this chapter: 
who should do the regulating? Traditionally we have thought about this question 
through the dichotomy of state versus market. Not ‘the market’ as a mechanism 
which generates regulatory benefits, but the market as a collection of actors 
capable of coordinating to produce and enforce rules regulating their activities.   
Through this lens we ask: in what, if any, circumstances should market actors 
regulate corporate activity themselves by endogenously generating and enforcing 
regulation without overt state involvement; and in what, if any, circumstances is 
such endogenous self-regulation likely to occur in practice?  
Of course the rigid dichotomy of the state as regulator versus the market as 
self-regulator does not do justice to the different ways in which the state and the 
market interact to produce corporate law and regulation. In some sense both the 
state and the market are always involved in the production of regulation: the 
state’s deference to self-regulation is inimical to its formation; the market forms 
state regulation through consultation, repeat player activity and lobbying.    
However, in this chapter we are interested not in the ways in which the market 
moulds and influences regulation but in the circumstances in which it actually 
controls the production and enforcement of that regulation. Endogenous self-
regulation is the ideal type of such regulation, but it is not the only one. Where 
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there are regulatory benefits for the state to defer to the market to generate and 
enforce rules, the state, cognisant of these benefits, may command the market, 
collectively or individually, to generate regulation or to engage in practices that 
lead to targeted norm formation. We might view this type of regulation as forced 
self-regulation. We refer to this form of regulation in the chapter as market-controlled 
regulation and distinguish it from self-regulation which the chapter will view as the 
(quasi-) endogenous production of regulation in the absence of legal instruction.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore (i) the conditions in which self- and 
market controlled regulation arise in the field of corporate law, and (ii) the 
practical and substantive effects of relying on these modes of regulation. We 
explore these issues primarily through the lens of the dominant real-world 
examples of self- and market-controlled regulation in the field of corporate law; 
examples which are often lauded by regulators and commentators alike as model 
examples of these forms of regulation. They are: the UK Takeover Code and the 
Takeover Panel created in 1968; and the ‘comply or explain’ approach to the 
regulation of board structure and composition, pioneered in the UK in the early 
1990s. The chapter is concerned both with exploring the conditions of their 
creation and success but also, in these conditions,  exploring the scope for their 
replication in other jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
II. FORMS AND PRE-CONDITIONS  
 
1. ENDOGENOUS SELF-REGULATION OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY 
 
Self-regulation as an ideal theoretical type is said to generate several benefits. Self-
regulation is cheap and imposes no direct cost on the state treasury: the 
marketplace pays for its own regulation.1 In addition to such direct cost benefits, 
self-regulation has clear potential regulatory benefits. First and foremost, it is a 
means of addressing often acute knowledge and information asymmetries 
afflicting the relationship between the regulator and the regulated constituency. 
Market actors live the regulated activity and, accordingly, both understand the 
problems and issues that are generated by such activity and understand the means 
for most efficiently counteracting such problems through regulation. In contrast, 
state regulators, even ones with revolving doors from and back into practice, have 
partial vision and understanding of such activity and are more likely therefore to 
craft sub-optimal regulation that neither deals with the actual problems and, 
worse, imposes unnecessary costs on such activity. This is compounded by the 
them against us lens generated by state regulation which disincentives information 
                                                     
1 Of course this may be viewed simply as a form of indirect taxation as the costs of the regulation will be 
passed through to the consumers in the market place. Furthermore, there is no reason why state 
regulation cannot impose the costs directly on market players through a regulatory levy – which again is 
likely to be be passed through to end users.  
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sharing as a result, inter alia, of the unpredictability of how a state regulator might 
respond to shared information about market practices. In contrast, the market’s 
'ownership' of the regulatory space both promotes information sharing with the 
self-regulator and, in theory, promotes behavioural norms which foster 
compliance. The second, well traversed,2 benefit of self-regulation is that it is able 
to respond more quickly to new forms of activity that require regulation. Not only, 
for the reasons set forth above, is the self-regulator likely to be aware of the 
problem earlier, it is also not constrained by the procedures, checks and balances 
associated with state action through primary or secondary legislation or through an 
authorised regulator.   
Clearly, however, one needs to be wary of such broad brush claims about the 
benefits of self-regulation. State regulatory forms, particularly regulatory bodies 
with rule-making authority, have the capacity to move relatively quickly. And self-
regulatory bodies also typically provide for time-consuming procedures to effect 
rule changes.  This is because public expectations of due process and consultation 
typically inform non-state as well as state bodies. And not all forms of corporate 
activity generate acute information asymmetries between the regulator and the 
regulated. Corporate and audit scandals in the last two decades, as well as the 
Global Financial Crisis, have illuminated areas of corporate activity where such 
asymmetries clearly exist such as the accounting for off-balance sheet transactions 
or complex derivative instruments such as collateralised debt obligations.  
However, in many areas of corporate life, although we find market innovation and 
smart structuring, the conflict surrounding such activity typically renders it visible 
and comprehensible. For example, innovative activity in the market for corporate 
control has typically been transparent because of the conflict it has generated. 
Consider, for example, takeover defences in the 1960s, 70s and 80s or the conflicts 
over the use of equity swaps in the 2000s. In these areas, claims that self-
regulation addresses asymmetries of knowledge and information are overstated 
because the asymmetries are insignificant.  
As with the benefits of self-regulation, its potential costs have been 
thoroughly explored. Most importantly in this regard is the concern that the self-
regulator will abuse its position and its knowledge and information advantage to 
craft rules that enhance its welfare position at the expense of other affected parties 
that have no control or influence over the rule making and enforcement process. 
State regulators are, of course, not immune from rent seeking but are thought – 
certainly in the eyes of the state regulators themselves! –  more able to resist 
pressures from market constituents and more likely to be able to craft rules that 
are not biased in favour of any particular constituency.  The extent to which a self-
regulator is able to bias the rules in favour of market actors is a function of several 
factors. First, whether or not other non-participating parties are thought to be 
                                                     
2 See for example, ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE AND MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICE (2011). 
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affected by the activity in question. Where the activity is thought only to affect the 
direct parties involved (or where such third-party effects although real are very 
opaque), then the independence concern will be (or will be seen to be) less 
pressing so long as all affected market participants have a voice in such self-
regulation. It is in such areas in particular where the welfare case for self-regulation 
is a strong one. Secondly, the extent to which bias is a concern is dependent on 
the alignment, or lack thereof, of the interests of the self-regulatory rule-maker 
and the perceived interests of society. If, for example, institutional shareholder 
groups exercise self-regulatory authority and the prevailing political and social 
norms view the advancement of shareholder interests as congruent with social 
welfare, then any such rule-bias is unproblematic. Thirdly, the extent of this bias 
problem is, paradoxically, connected to one of the purported key benefits of self-
regulation: the knowledge and information asymmetries of market actors.  Where 
such asymmetries are significant, self-regulatory actors have more room to deploy 
self-interest as the ability of the state and other non-state actors, such as the 
financial press, to assess and monitor whether the rules are biased is much 
diminished. This means that when we think about the welfare implications of self- 
versus state- regulation we find that both the benefits and the costs are higher 
where knowledge and information asymmetries are significant. 
The second consensus drawback with self-regulation is the concern that the 
self-regulator is unlikely to enforce the rules against its own. There are two reasons 
given for this: the absence of the enforcement apparatus of the state and the lack 
of distance between the regulator and the regulated which undermines the 
willingness of the regulator to impose available sanctions for breach. Of course 
these enforcement problems may be counterbalanced to some degree by both the 
positive compliance effects, mentioned above, of 'owning' the regulatory space as 
well as the precarious nature of self-regulation – if rules are too pro-market and 
are not enforced, the likelihood increases that the market will lose the regulatory 
franchise.  
 
2. THEORIZING THE PRECONDITIONS FOR SELF-REGULATION 
 
We might think about the probability that the market will elect to regulate itself 
through the lens of the costs (or lost benefits) of failing to do so. Clearly for many 
market actors there are significant benefits of remaining unregulated. However, 
market actors will collectively realise that where their actions are generating public 
and political disquiet, there is a distinct likelihood of state regulatory intervention. 
Self-regulation in such a context may impose costs on market actors but will be 
viewed as the lesser of two evils and as way of deflecting political pressures to 
introduce more costly state regulation. Presented more formally, where CSR < CS 
then market actors will enter the 'contracting zone'3 to produce self-regulation, 
                                                     
3 I am grateful to Michael Klausner for encouraging me to present this analysis through the lens of the 
contracting zone. 
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where compared to a state of the world without regulation: CSR equals the costs4 for market 
participants of a self-regulatory regime which they control and enforce plus the 
transaction costs – the costs of coordination – of agreeing on and maintaining the 
terms of self-regulation; CS is the cost of state regulation to the market actors; and 
CSR and CS are both discounted for the probability of state intervention. The costs 
of co-ordination will vary as a function of the homogeneity and proximity of the 
actors in question. Such homogeneity and proximity are also likely to foster co-
ordination cost reducing norms such as a sense of responsibility for the space 
within which the activity takes place.    
CSR and CS are individual variables for each player – or category of player – in 
the marketplace. Where there are multiple categories of player it is possible that 
whereas CSR < CS for some categories, CSR > CS for others. In such circumstances 
all parties will not be brought into the 'contracting zone' in the absence of either 
some differential power weighting for key actors for whom CSR < CS or a 
coordinating mechanism that ensures a response where in aggregate CSR < CS. A 
similar calculus operates where market actors’ concern is not the cost implications 
of state regulation but the costs implications of the failure to regulate, due to, for 
example, the political-failures of the executive or legislative authorities that are 
deadlocked or for other reasons incapable of acting. Here participants will, 
optimally, enter the contracting zone where the aggregate benefits of self-
regulation, BSR, exceed the transaction costs of coordination. Although again, 
individual variation in BSR may impede parties entering the contracting zone.     
 
 
Figure 1: Contracting Zone Open:5 
            
 
                                                     
4 If C represents benefits and not costs then the inequality is reversed for market participants to enter the 
contracting zone: CSR > CS.  
5 These diagrams address CSR > < CS not BSR < > 0. 
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 Figure 2: Contracting Zone Closed: 
 
 
 
It is plausible that such a cost calculus is an important component of the drivers of 
the real world examples of self-regulation. However, it is most certainly a 
secondary driver. Whether actors can enter the contracting zone is a function of 
whether the state will countenance self-regulation. In an idealised world if the state 
acts as a rational actor, whether it would permit self-regulation would be a 
function of an assessment of the the costs and benefits of self- and state- 
regulation, outlined in Section 1 above, as applied to the particular regulatory 
context. Where the social welfare benefits of self-regulation exceed those of state 
regulation one would expect a rational state to permit or to facilitate self-regulation 
and where they do not to pre-empt self-regulatory contracting. 
 
 
Figure 3: Contracting Zone Open: 
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 Figure 4: Contracting Zone Closed: 
 
 
 
But clearly, the willingness of the state to open the contracting zone is a function 
of more than such a calculus. Of central importance in this regard is the regulatory 
conception of the state and whether such a conception countenances or 
encourages self-regulation. By regulatory conception of the state I mean the shared 
understanding – amongst politicians, market actors and citizens more broadly – 
about the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate for the state to exercise 
power to identify and address problems generated by interactions within civil 
society; or, put differently, legitimate or illegitimate for non-state actors to perform 
regulatory, state-like functions.  Where this regulatory conception of the state does 
not countenance self-regulation, even where Figures 1 and 3 apply, there is no scope 
for the market place to  legitimately occupy the regulatory space policed by the 
state and therefore no scope for there to be a 'contracting zone' within which the 
market actors’ cost calculus could operate. In such a context market actors are left 
to try and coordinate improved behaviour in the hope of dampening political 
concern, or, where the problem is the failure of the state to act, to lobby for state 
action. Where the conception of the state is open to, or favourable to, market-
based action then the contracting zone comes into play. It is for this reason that it 
is unsurprising that we find that many of the examples of corporate self-regulation 
– some of which are discussed in this chapter – are produced in the United 
Kingdom, a jurisdiction that for several centuries  actively promoted local and 
market-based solutions to identified problems. An approach that resulted from a 
longstanding and deeply held 'wariness towards the central state apparatus'.6   
                                                     
6 See generally, ALAN FOX, HISTORY AND HERITAGE: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS SYSTEM (1988). I am very grateful to Paul Davies for recommending to me that I consider the 
theory of state set forth in this wonderful text. 
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Social Welfare 
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There is a significant body of scholarship on the passive conception of the 
UK state which we can only touch in here. Jenks, for example, contrasts the 
prevailing political style in nineteenth and twentieth century Britain with the 
'imaginative conception of politics' associated with the utilitarianism of Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill.7 For Jenks, this utilitarian conception of politics involved an 
active form of government: 'a conception of problem solving and exploration of 
opportunities for innovation as the very stuff of politics'. The British political style 
and the conception of the state that underpinned it was the antithesis of such an 
active and interventionist style. For Jenks, the British approach is characterised by 
sobriety, neutrality and a resistance to problem solving, almost a willed passivity in 
the face of identified problems until faced with no alternative but to act. In his 
seminal work on the history of industrial relations in the UK Alan Fox observes 
that as 'it was not part of the state's duty to anticipate and meet needs which 
seemed likely to grow'; the problem would have to grow 'to a major size before the 
government decided to step in'. But as the great labour lawyer Otto Kahn-Freund 
observed, the resistance to proactive intervention and directed control should not 
be mistaken for the absence of any form of intervention or role for law. For 
Kahn-Freund, in the UK there was widespread support for the 'social institution' 
of 'organized persuasion' where the state’s, and law’s, role was to facilitate parties 
in creating order, reaching agreement and resolving conflict.8 At most, 
Government's role was to take steps – from cajoling actors to respond, to the 
creation of institutional structures – that would facilitate actors in addressing the 
problem themselves. The bedfellow of this political outlook was an expectation, 
and sense of entitlement, that market actors themselves should be given an 
opportunity to address identified problems themselves. For politicians, an electoral 
minefield awaited those who proactively disturbed those expectations, and 
accordingly 'crisis dimensions' were required to drive government to [directly] 
intervene.9  
This conception of the British State helps understand why, until the latter part 
of the twentieth century, in the UK there was no form of what today we would 
recognise as capital market or banking regulation, responsibility for which was left 
to the City of London and the City’s 'Pope',10 the Governor of the Bank of 
England, a non-state body itself until 1947. An approach which led Louis Loss in 
his treatise on US Securities Regulation to observe that it was paradoxical that the 
US 'the arch apostles of private enterprise should have resorted to public control 
                                                     
7 Craig Jenks, T.H. Green, The Oxford Philosophy of Duty and the English Middle Class (1977) 28 BRITISH 
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 481, 494. 
8 Otto Kahn-Freund, Industrial Relations and the Law – retrospect and prospect, 7 BRITISH JOURNAL OF 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 301 (1969).  
9 Fox supra note 6, 374. 
10 Sir Leslie warns on the Takeover Code, (16 August, 1968 THE GUARDIAN). A different metaphor used in 
relation to the Bank of England was the Bank as 'parent'.  Harry Siepmann of Lazards referred to the 
'faith in the Bank as the Leader and Parent of the City' (DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON: A 
CLUB NO MORE (2002), 57. 
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while socialist Britain…should have left so wide a field free from state control'.11  
This conception also helps explain why the UK did not have a developed system 
of industrial relations or labour law until well into the 1970s. A regulatory lacunae 
that was viewed as a mark of success not state failure. Alan Fox observes in this 
regard that in as late as the early 1960s: 
 
The industrial relations systems of less 'mature' capitalisms such as the United 
States and Germany were thought to reveal their immaturity by their heavy 
dependence on legal definitions and sanctions and on their being more 
consciously and deliberately designed by the state.12 
 
Whilst one can chart a retreat from, or the disintegration of, this conception 
during the post-World War II period, and in a more pronounced way in past 40 
years, many of the classic examples of corporate and non-corporate self-regulation 
in the UK, are in large part a product of this conception and, as we shall see 
below, its mark is still impressed on contemporary self- and market controlled UK 
approaches to the regulation of the corporation.  In other jurisdictions, including 
twentieth century United States and other European jurisdictions, where the 
conception of the regulatory state more closely approximates Jenk’s utilitarian 
conception of politics,13 the scope for market players to take control of the 
regulatory space and enter the contracting zone was much more attenuated.  
Unsurprisingly, in such jurisdictions examples of self-regulation are much less 
prevalent.   
Where the conception of the state does enable self-regulation, the activity that 
takes place within the 'contracting zone' must be framed through a continuing 
relationship of the state to the contracting market actors. We have already noted 
the role of possible state intervention in incentivizing actors to enter the 
contracting zone – the threat to act if the market fails to do so. Moreover, the 
long-term success and stability of any self-regulatory response is dependent upon 
it maintaining its (democratic) legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the state. In 
particular, as the self-regulator usurps the regulatory function of the state it must 
be seen to do so in an unbiased and even-handed way. Arguably, this need to 
maintain legitimacy renders self-regulation unstable, if not unworkable, in the long 
run in contexts where due to knowledge and information asymmetries it is difficult 
for the state to assess whether or not the self-regulator is acting in a neutral or 
unbiased fashion. Visible failures in that market place are likely to lead to the 
                                                     
11 See L.C.B. Gower, Investor Protection in the USA, 15 MODERN LAW REVIEW 446, 447 (1952). 
12 FOX, supra note 6. 
13 Clearly this chapter cannot undertake a broad ranging comparative analysis of the conceptions of the  
regulatory state in US and European jurisdictions. But in support of this claim consider, and compare, for 
example, the mid-20th century UK approach to the regulation of financial markers, corporate law, 
antitrust and labour law with the evolution of US federal securities regulation (Gower, supra note 11), 
antitrust regulation, corporate law (see David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 8 NYU 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS 395 (2012) and labour law (see generally ALAN FOX, supra note 6).   
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inference of self-regulatory failure. Even if such an inference is inaccurate, the 
knowledge and information asymmetries make it very difficult to explain to the 
regulator, or the public, why it is inaccurate. In these contexts, such failures may in 
of themselves irretrievably de-legitimise the self-regulator regardless of any failing 
or fault on its part.   
 
3. MARKET-CONTROLLED REGULATION 
 
Everyone wants the best of both worlds. But invariably the real world consists of 
second best solutions that make inevitable trade-offs between the ‘bests’ of each 
world. The above analysis has identified several advantages of self-regulation but 
also several bias, enforcement and stability problems. Would it be possible to 
devise a system of corporate regulation that gets the upside of self-regulation but 
minimises the downside? For the state to demarcate the contours of regulation, 
but to command the market to fill in the substantive content of that regulation?  
That is, is it possible to leverage the advantages of self-regulation in rule 
production – in particular the markets’ knowledge and information advantages – 
whilst at the same time maintaining formal state oversight of the regulation? We 
might describe this approach to corporate regulation as forced self-regulation or 
'market-controlled regulation'.  
Typically in the corporate law and governance space this takes place through a 
legal or regulatory requirement to comply with or to take account of rules 
produced by market actors. Corporate governance codes provide perhaps the best 
example of this where legislation or regulation in several jurisdictions provides that 
companies must comply or explain their failure to comply with the rules produced 
by a designated governance body or commission.14 These bodies are usually hybrid 
state/market regulator staffed by market participants but with some formal 
connection to the state. We explore this form of market-controlled regulation in 
Part IV of this chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE is not part of THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION 
ACT but the requirement for publicly traded German Stock Corporations to comply with or to explain 
the failure to comply with its provisions are set forth in section 161 of the German Stock Corporation 
Law. The Code is produced by a Government appointed commission. Similarly, THE UK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE although maintained by a quasi-state body, the FRC, benefits from a mandatory 
requirement in the UK Financial Conduct Authority's Listing Rules to comply or explain non-compliance 
with the Governance Code (LR 9.8.6(5)). Across the Atlantic, the Governance rules set forth in the New 
York Stock Exchange are the product of a self-regulatory organisation, but SRO's are authorised by the 
SEC and their rules, including the governance rules are subject to SEC oversight and approval (see 
section 19 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). 
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III. 'ENDOGENOUS' SELF-REGULATION: A TAKEOVER 
CASE STUDY IN THE UK AND BRAZIL 
   
 
Examples of successful self-regulatory regimes that regulate significant parts of 
corporate activity and that have no formal connection to the state are rare. The 
most notable example is the UK’s Takeover Code and the Takeover Panel which 
enforces and maintains the Code. The Code provides an extremely comprehensive 
body of rules regulating all aspects of the takeover process for publicly traded 
companies. The Takeover Panel is globally recognised as one of the most powerful 
and effective command and control regulators.  Yet between 1968 and 2005 – 
when it became a state regulator as a result on the implementation of the EU’s 
Takeover Directive15 – this was achieved without direct instruction from, or 
empowerment by, legislation or regulation.  
The first attempt to regulate the UK takeover market followed political and 
media disquiet which arose in the 1950s as a result of target companies using  
takeover defences, including a crown jewel defence in the battle for the Savoy 
Hotel and a white squire share issue defence in the battle for British Aluminium.16  
These actions generated multi-facetted political and public concerns from which 
one would be hard pressed to identify a dominant concern.17 The concerns 
included: disapproval of hostile bids as an inappropriate interference in the 
“corporate bastion”;18 concern about the ethics of the takeover market place;19 
anxiety about the effects of hostile activity on economic policy commitments to 
restrict income inflation;20 and concerns about illegitimate board interference in 
shareholder sovereignty.21  In July 1959 this led the Bank of England, which at the 
time was solely responsible for 'regulating'22 banking and capital markets in the 
UK, to form a working group consisting of participants in the UK capital markets 
in order to produce a Code of Conduct to regulate hostile and competitive bids.  
                                                     
15 EU Directive 2004/25/EC. 
16 The two key events were the attempted takeover of the Savoy Hotel which involved a lock-up of its 
key asset, the Berkley Hotel and the battle for British Aluminium. In relation to which see Richard 
Roberts, Regulatory Responses to the Rise of the Market for Corporate Control in Britain in the 1950s 
(1992) 34 BUSINESS HISTORY 183, 187. 
17 See DAVID KERSHAW, FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF TAKEOVER REGULATION (2015, 
forthcoming) chapter 3 (on file with the author). 
18 Kynaston, supra note 10 in his magisterial history of the City of London notes in relation the British 
Aluminium takeover battle discussed below the 'entrenched belief that within its citadel, the board knew 
best'(at 112) . 
19 A note by Maudling, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, for the Prime Minister (Winston Churchill),  
observed that, although nothing could be done, 'the process is distasteful and politically embarrassing' 
Pro, PREM/656, Letter from the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to the Prime Minister, 13 
November 1953 (quoted in ROBERTS, supra note 16, 183, 188). 
20 See ROBERTS, supra, at note 15. 
21 See 'Directors Duties' FINANCIAL TIMES (8 December 1953). 
22 Regulation in this context would be a misnomer as banks and capital markets actors were regulated by 
the Bank of England through direct supervision and what is sometimes referred to as a regime of nods 
and winks – see KYNASTON, supra note 10 at 562. 
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Importantly, UK merchant (investment) banks – through their trade association 
the Issuing Houses Association – took control of the production of this Code of 
Conduct. They produced their own working party which was tasked with 
producing an initial draft code.23 Other market constituencies clearly had input 
into this process although it was reported that that there was 'general agreement 
about the principles involved'.24 The resulting Code of Conduct, which came into 
force in 1959, was cumbersomely named the ‘Notes on the Amalgamation of 
British Business’. However, the Code was wholly unsuccessful and did not 
generate behavioural constraint in the UK takeover market. From the moment it 
was published it was clear that it would not constrain behaviour when an actor’s 
interest diverged from the rules. There was no body responsible for updating and 
enforcing the Notes and although the Notes contained the structural and 
substantive seeds of modern takeover regulation, in many instances they were 
comically ambiguous: For example: 'every effort' should be made to avoid market 
disturbance; shareholders should be given 'adequate time (say three weeks) for 
accepting' the offer; and it was 'desirable' that the offer is for the whole share 
capital.  It was, therefore, unsurprisingly that the market place ignored the Notes 
in multiple ways,25 including the replication of the very events that led to the 
Notes on the Amalgamation of Business. For example, in the1967 battle for Cook 
& Watts Ltd the target board locked-up a deal with its preferred bidder by 
agreeing to issue a majority of the company’s ordinary shares in exchange for the 
sale of one of the preferred bidder’s subsidiaries.26 Similarly, later in the same year 
in relation to a hostile bid for Metal Industries, the target again agreed to issue a 
block of shares in exchange for the sale of the preferred bidder’s subsidiary.27 
These events generated renewed political and media clamour for regulatory 
intervention and again resulted in the Bank of England bringing market 
participants together to put their own house in order.28 For the first time the 
group included representatives of management. Again the merchant banks 
through the Issuing Houses Association took the lead in revising the Code. A sub-
committee was created to revise the Notes, which 'did most of the work and the 
drafting of the code' and consisted only of Issuing House Association 
representatives from four merchant banks, one of whom, Robert Clark, had 
                                                     
23 See 'City Views on Take-Over Bids' (31 October 1959) FINANCIAL TIMES observing that the Notes 
were 'prepared by the Issuing Houses Association in co-operation with' the other working group members" 
(emphasis supplied). Roberts reports that the original draft of the Code was produced by its Chairman 
J.S. French who was a director of the Issuing House London and Yorkshire Trust (supra note 16, at 195).  
24 Id. 
25 See, for example, Phillips’ takeover of Pye in January of 1967 ‘Explanation of share transactions’ (26 
January 1967)  FINANCIAL TIMES and the battle for Wilkinson & Ridell (‘Behind the scenes of the 
Wilkinson & Ridell Battle’ (29 June 1967) FINANCIAL TIMES. Both involving favourable treatment for 
institutional shareholders. 
26 'Courtaulds wins Cook' (28 April 1967) THE GUARDIAN. 
27 '"Outrageous" and Sir Jules puts Thorn back in the battle' (17 July 1967) THE GUARDIAN. 
28 See John Armour and David Skeel’s careful documentation of this process and the resulting creation, at 
the end of the 1960s, of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and its enforcer, the Takeover Panel 
(John Armour and David Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takoevers and Why? – Peculiar Divergence of US 
and UK Takeover Regulation 95 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1727 (2097)).  
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previously been a partner at Slaughter and May, the leading City law firm.29  The 
result was the newly named Takeover Code which, building on the Notes, 
provided a pro-shareholder code that directly responded to the problematic events 
that generated pressure for action and, of some contextual importance, was wholly 
in keeping with the pro-shareholder orientation of UK company law. 
Furthermore, the City provided for a self-regulatory body, staffed by 
representatives of market participants to administer the Code.  
Today’s Takeover Code provides for a set of extremely demanding rules as 
well as a feared and uncompromisingly independent regulator. Compared to the 
Takeover Code – which today amounts to 300 pages of rules and rule-guidance – 
other jurisdictions’ takeover rules, for example the US’s Williams Act, appear 
rather insubstantial, perhaps incomplete,30 and are much more deferential to the 
parties’ freedom to contract. In addition to the well-known non-frustration rule 
preventing any target board frustrating action,31 and the mandatory bid rules 
triggered when crossing the 30% threshold or further purchases within the 30-
50% ownership range,32 the Code provides many other highly interventionist and 
controlling rules. For example, the Code requires announcements of possible 
offers when there is any untoward movement in the share price33 – what amounts 
to untoward is determined by the Panel. In contrast to the Williams Act34 in the 
United States – which provides for an all-holders-best-price rule which applies 
only during the bid period and only in relation to one class of shares  – the 
Takeover Code requires bids for all share classes and convertibles35 and provides 
for an equal pricing rule both during the bid and between three-twelve months 
prior to the bid.36 The Code provides for what is known as a put-up or shut-up 
rule requiring the bidder to make an announcement of a firm offer 28 days 
following an announcement of a possible offer.37 An announcement of a firm offer 
as well as the offer itself may only be subject to limited conditionality which is 
controlled by the Panel.38  It is the Panel not the parties or a court that, for 
example, determines whether a material adverse change clause can be called. 
Finally, and perhaps most surprising for a US audience, the Code has long placed 
significant constraints on the use of deal protections including break-fees. Until 
                                                     
29 The members of the subcommittee were: Michael Bucks (Chairman) (Rothchilds); Robert Clark (Hill 
Samuel); Ken Barrington (Morgan Grenfell); Peter Cannon (Minster Trust – "an upstart finance house" – 
'The men behind the Code' (27 March 1968) FINANCIAL TIMES.  
30 Of course in considering the completeness of US takeover process regulation one needs to take 
account of the indirect process effects of the availability of takeover defences subject to state corporate 
law. 
31 Rule 21 Takeover Code. 
32 Rule 9 Takeover Code. 
33 Rules 2.4 Takeover Code 
34 Regulation 14D, Rule 14D-10 
35 Rules 14-15 Takeover Code. 
36 See Rule 6, 9 and 11 Takeover Code. 
37 Rule 2.6 Takeover Code. 
38 Rules 12 and 13 Takeover Code. 
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2011 a break-fee could not exceed one percent of deal value. After 2011, save in 
limited circumstances, they are prohibited altogether.39   
The Takeover Panel today is a state body. Pursuant to the Companies Act 
2006, which implemented the European Takeover Directive, the Panel is a 
‘recognised supervisory authority’.40 As a state body the Takeover Panel now has 
clear access to the power of the state to sanction Code transgressions.41 It is 
noteworthy that from the 1980s the Takeover Panel had theoretical access to the 
enforcement powers of the UK capital market regulators. And from its inception 
it had access to licensing sanctions in relation to certain market participants that 
were regulated by the Board of Trade, a government department. But these 
trappings of state power are of no relevance to the success of this endogenous 
self-regulatory body. They have never, and are highly unlikely to ever, be used. If 
the probability of Code compliance were a function of the probability of the use 
of some form of state power to enforce the Code, then there would be no 
compliance with the Code because the probability of the use of state power is 
zero. Yet there is close to total compliance with the Code; and incontrovertible 
deference to the views and instructions of the Panel. What then explains the 
success of this self-regulatory mechanism and what are the preconditions to 
replicating its success? These are important questions of contemporary relevance 
both generally to the question of in what circumstances, if any, can self-regulation 
be effectively deployed within corporate law, but also of specific importance to 
takeover regulation in other jurisdictions, such as Brazil, who are currently 
experimenting with similar forms of self-regulation often because vested interests 
or governance failures are thought to prevent the state from regulating directly and 
effectively.42  
Based on the experience of the Takeover Panel and Code, below I suggest 
five key drivers to the successful self-regulation of the market for corporate 
control. A set of drivers that suggest that the Takeover Panel’s existence and 
success is sui generis and that successful replication in other jurisdictions is 
improbable.  
 
1. THE DEFERENTIAL STATE 
 
The Takeover Code and the Takeover Panel are the product of the mid-twentieth 
century conception of the British state which, as detailed in the Introduction above, 
contained an inbuilt assumption of state passivity. This lens generated a regulatory 
logic which viewed the UK state’s role as one of facilitating and organizing self-
regulatory solutions. This conception did not merely generate space for the 
'contracting zone', it actively encouraged entry by market participants. Consider, 
                                                     
39 Rule 21.2 Takeover Code. 
40 Section 942 Companies Act 2006. 
41 See sections 952-956 Companies Act 2006. 
42 See generally, Henry Hansmann, Ronald J. Gilson, Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as Development 
Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the US and the EU 123 YALE LAW JOURNAL 948 (2014). 
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for example, the UK Government’s sense of powerlessness in relation to the 
Battle for British Aluminium.  Kynaston notes in this regard that the Prime 
Minister's (Harold Macmillan's) view was that 'it would be a grave political error to 
interfere now […] Let the rival forces fight it out […] It's the only safe course'.43  
Self-regulation of the takeover market in the UK is often presented as political 
disarmament: the powerful state threatens to act which leads market actors to self-
regulate their activity in order to deflect intervention. This is invariably a key factor 
in driving what appear to be self-regulatory solutions. And this lens certainly 
animated many actors and commentators around the time of the formation of the 
Code and the Panel.44 But this lens must be placed within the context of this then 
prevailing conception of the British state which created a presumption and an 
expectation – firmly held within government, the City of London and the Bank of 
England – that market participants should address and resolve the problems of 
their own making. State intervention in the market for corporate control in the 
UK at the end of the 1950s and 1960s would have represented a regulatory 
paradigm fissure. Publicly stated fears and threats of intervention must accordingly 
be discounted to take cognisance of this conception. Consider in this regard the 
Financial Times’ LEX column on July of 1967 that called both for more precise 
rules and a means of enforcement in light of the multiple high profile takeover 
'scandals' of that year. It noted the concern that if the issues were not addressed by 
the City then Government may be forced to step in.45 A concern that was repeated 
in the press and crystallised around an idea of the threat of a British Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).46 In spite of this perceived looming 'threat', in fact 
consistent with the longstanding British regulatory style, the Government, the 
media and the City, were all of the view that the takeover problem was 
presumptively a problem for the City to solve. Less than a week later in his 
Mansion House speech the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, echoed the FT’s 
sentiments but observed that 'it is for the City to ensure that these processes are 
and are seen to be, carried through in accordance with clearly formulated rules'. Of 
course, if the City failed to act there remained a threat of Government 
intervention and certainly by the late 1960s this threat was increasing as more 
commentators called for a break with tradition and greater state involvement in 
the regulation of business.47 But given the continuing weight of presumption 
                                                     
43 KYNASTON, supra note 10, 114. 
44 ‘What the new bid panel needs to do’ LEX, (21 September 1967) FINANCIAL TIMES. 
45 Id. 
46 ‘What the new bid panel needs to do’ LEX, (21 September 1967) FINANCIAL TIMES. 
47 In 1969 (see supra note 8) Otto Kahn-Freund argued  in the context of industrial relations that the law 
'should be called upon to play a much increased role in the moulding of industrial relations,  and this in a 
manner that is contrary to a long established tradition, a tradition, however, that is beginning to fade'.  
Although beginning to fade it remained a forceful lens. Consider, for example, the Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and Employee Associations, the Donovan Commission, was set up in the mid-1960s to consider 
labour relations and collective bargaining problems. Several of the recommendations involved direct legal 
intervention. However, importantly, the primary innovation recommended by the Donovan Commission, 
and subsequently adopted by the Labour Government in its 1969 White Paper, IN PLACE OF STRIFE, 
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associated with the British approach to governance, the probability of intervention 
at this point was still extremely low. Historically situated, governmental concerns 
and media attention were communicative triggers to tell the City to organise itself 
to address the concerns that had arisen in relation to takeovers.  
The centrality of this conception of the state to the UK takeover regulation 
story suggests that this form of corporate self-regulation is sui-generis. In the 
absence of a similar conception, the contracting zone may be locked as self-
regulation is viewed as an illegitimate intrusion into the role of the state; an anti-
democratic grab for state authority. Moreover, this sense of illegitimate intrusion is 
likely to be compounded in more  modern regulatory settings for capital markets, 
which typically already provide for a capital markets regulator who would be 
viewed as the natural regulator for such a new regulatory venture and who is likely 
to make a territorial claim thereover. In the United States context, for example, at 
the time of the introduction of the Williams’ Act the pre-existence of the SEC 
generated a path dependent preference to address takeovers through an expanded 
SEC jurisdiction.48 This factor is of particular concern in relation to modern 
attempts to replicate the Takeover Code’s self-regulatory success. Brazil has been 
much lauded for its regulatory dualism which involves the introduction of 
alternative regulatory regimes designed to offer companies and shareholders, at 
their election,  protections that the state has failed to offer.49 In this vein of 
regulatory dualism, a body of market constituents has recently come together in 
Brazil to produce a self-designated Committee on Mergers and Acquisitions (CAF).50 
The CAF Code describes the body as 'a non-statutory independent body created 
by representatives from the main Brazilian capital market players to operate on the 
basis of a voluntary self-regulation model'.51 It provides takeover regulation to 
companies that elect to be bound by its rules.52 Although this author is in no 
position to provide any account of the contemporary conception of the Brazilian 
state, and whether or not it is similarly open to endogenous self-regulatory 
initiatives, it is clear that attempts to generate space for this regulatory solution 
have generated difficulties in traversing the territorial authority of the existing 
Brazilian Capital Markets regulator, CVM. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the 
Code itself observes that it 'should not be regarded as a substitute' for either law 
or CVM.53 That is, there is a pre-existing occupant of this regulatory space, even if 
                                                                                                                                       
involved the setting up of a Commission on Industrial Relations, a body staffed with non-governmental 
members from unions, business and academia. The Commission47 was designed to facilitate the voluntary 
reform of the collective bargaining system; this was 'organized persuasion' par excellence.    
48 John Armour & David Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why 95 GEORGETOWN LAW 
JOURNAL 1727, 1776-1785 (2007) detailing the centrality of the SEC to the US regulatory response to 
takeover concerns in the 1960s. 
49 See Hansmann et al supra note 41. 
50 CAF stands for Comitê de Aquisições e Fusões. See: http://www.cafbrasil.org.br/eng/index.html.  
51 CAF Code, Introduction, 1. 
52 See CAF Code, Introduction, 3. Companies sign up by amending the subject company’s bylaws to 
provide that they are subject to the Code. In addition directors, officers and controlling shareholders sign 
“statements of adherence” to the Code. 
53 CAF Code, Introduction, 1(iii). 
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– to carry the occupation metaphor further – they have been neglecting their 
property. 
 
2. ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL: RULES TRADE-OFFS AND 
COORDINATING MECHANISMS  
 
Provided the contracting zone is open, it is necessary to get the affected market 
actors to the contracting table. The first UK Takeover Code acknowledged the 
importance of buy-in from all parties. In a statement issued shortly after its 
formation the Panel referred to the importance that the 'voluntary system should 
function effectively and command the respect of all'.54 If key players opt-out then 
there can be no self-regulatory solution. As noted above, the cost calculus for 
market actors will vary for different parties with both CSR < and > CS and BSR < 
and > 0 for different participants. There are two key considerations for 
successfully getting parties into the contracting zone. First, as BSR and CSR will be, 
inter alia, a function of the selected self-regulatory rule choices compromises will 
have to be made to ensure that rule choices are not made that render BSR < 0  or 
CSR > CS for key players.  In addition, but also as a substitute for such rule trade-
offs, contracting is more likely to take place where there are co-ordinating 
mechanisms in place that either force contracting or the reduce the co-ordination 
costs of contracting.      
Let us consider first the relationship between rule choice and variation in 
relation BSR. If the rule makers reject the basic economic logic that key players will 
not contract if BSR < 0, the self-regulatory venture is likely to fail. This logic and 
lesson does not bode well for Brazil's attempt to generate self-regulatory dualism 
in the takeover field. CAF has the support of several constituents of the Brazilian 
Capital Market including: the Brazilian Securities Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA 
S.A. -Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros, 'BVMF'); the Association of Capital 
Markets Investors (Associação de Investidores no Mercado de Capitais; 'AMEC'); the 
Brazilian Association of Entities of the Financial and Capital Markets (Associação 
Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais, 'ANBIMA'); and the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança 
Corporativa, 'IBGC'). However, the Brazilian Association of Publicly-Held 
Corporations (Associação Brasileira das Companhias Abertas, 'ABRASCA') did not join 
the group after a long period of negotiation.  The reason for their opt out is 
thought to be the mandatory bid pricing rule contained in the Code.55 A 
mandatory bid is triggered by a purchase of between 20-30% of the target’s shares 
(the precise percentage determined by the by-laws).56 The mandatory bidder must 
offer to all shareholders the highest price paid for the shares in the previous 
                                                     
54 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Policy Statement (28 April, 1969). 
55 See CAF Code, Section VI on ‘Material Ownership Tender Offers’. 
56 See definition of “Material Ownership” in CAF Code.  
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twelve months.57 The rule is understood to further the key takeover regulatory 
goal of equality of treatment of shareholders.58  However, for many large Brazilian 
companies which are subject to blockholder control, such a rule would prevent a 
controller from receiving any payment for its private benefits of control as any per 
share control premium paid to the blockholder within a twelve month look-back 
period must also be offered to all shareholders. It is a forced sharing rule which, 
given the consensual nature of Code application, means that blockholder owned 
public companies are unlikely to sign-up. Nor will their trade association, 
ABRASCA. Alternative rules would have enabled sign-up by this key constituency: 
for example, no or a short look-back period would enable premium block 
purchases which would not be subject to the highest price rule; or a weighted 
pricing rule taking a percentage of the highest price paid. Of course, even in the 
absence of widespread sign-up by public companies, from a regulatory dualism 
perspective the Code still offers benefits to existing widely-held companies – as 
well as companies that intend to effect an IPO where there will be no post-IPO 
controller – allowing them to elect to lock-in59 the sharing rule which many 
minority shareholders would value. Nevertheless, rule integrity here appears to 
jeopardise generating momentum for the project. What is driving this 
counterproductive rule-choice is difficult to parse. But it seems plausible that a 
possible driver is a classic translation problem: the desire of cosmopolitan legal 
elites to replicate, and to find authority for legal change in, foreign 'best practice' 
regulation60 – here in relation to the perceived importance of the equality of 
treatment of shareholders – at the expense of pragmatic adaptation to the 
conditions of the local market place. It is noteworthy in this regard that by the 
time the UK adopted a twelve month sharing rule for the mandatory bid rule in 
the mid-1970s there had been a significant reduction in the number of controlling 
shareholders in publicly traded companies and a concomitant increase in 
institutional holdings.61 
Where parties refuse to enter or reach agreement within the contracting zone, 
optimal welfare enhancing solutions – for the state and aggregate market actors – 
may be left on the table. In such circumstances coordination mechanisms are 
required to enable self-regulation. The story of the Takeover Code in this regard 
directs us to the importance of the financial incentives of pivotal players for co-
ordinating self-regulatory contracting. Most important in this regard were the 
financial incentives of merchant (investment) banks. Prior to the Battle for British 
Aluminium, UK merchants banks were almost exclusively pro-management.62 The 
seismic cultural shock which resulted from the failure of the target to succeed in 
                                                     
57 Article 65(1) CAFCode. 
58 Article 29(1) CAF Code. 
59 Lock in here is somewhat limited given to option of exit from the Code following a one year notice 
period. See CAF Code, Articles 23-25. 
60 See generally William Ewald, Comparative Legal Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants 43 THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 489 discussing the work of Alan Watson on legal transplants. 
61 See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (2008) 301-377. 
62 KYNASTON, supra note 10 at Chapter 6. 
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this case led bankers to realise that their business model had to adapt to take 
account of the fact that there was money to be made in hostile activity.  
'Overnight', Roberts observes, City attitudes to takeovers changed and 'financial 
advisors added hostile bids to their repertoire of merger and acquisition 
techniques'.63 Bankers came to realise that there was money to be made in an 
active takeover market and in regulation that wedded takeover activity to the 
financial advisory role. These investment bankers were at the centre of a network 
of advisory services, many of which were essential components in making a 
takeover bid. Accordingly, once the market place incentivised bankers to come 
into the contracting zone many others had no choice but to follow.  
Plausibly, such an investment banker driven co-ordinating mechanism could 
act as a substitute for the absence of state or quasi-state drivers, as is the case in 
Brazil. However, for two reasons such replication is improbable. First, such an 
option is only available where hostile activity levels are sufficient to encourage 
bankers to take a more neutral stance between targets and acquirers. Where 
controlling ownership structures block a significant increase in such activity levels, 
as they do in Brazil,  investment banker buy-in is likely to be difficult. Secondly, 
although investment bankers co-ordinated self-regulation in the UK, it was not an 
endogenous market response. Although co-ordinated action was in the bankers’ 
interests and co-ordination costs for bankers were low - given pre-existing 
structures for collective action64 and the close, geographically proximate and 
relatively homogenous environment which was the Squire Mile of the City of 
London at this point in time65  – bankers faced a prisoners dilemma coordination 
problem between 1959 and the introduction of the Notes and the creation of the 
Code and Panel. Although it was in the long term financial interests of bankers 
(individually and collectively) to control a regulatory system that put them at the 
heart of the process, in the immediate term in the absence of such a system it was 
in the individual bankers’ interests to serve their client’s needs by facilitating 
creative (non-) compliance with the Notes. This they did in multiple high profile 
events.66 What was required – and what was in the bankers’ individual and 
collective long term interests – was forced co-ordination, which arose indirectly 
from state expectation in response these events and directly from the Bank of 
England, who during this period remained the self-styled 'Pope'67 of the City.68 In 
other jurisdictions, in the absence of such direct or indirect state pressure  – which 
                                                     
63 Roberts supra note 16 at 193. See also Armour & Skeel, supra note 47 at 1775 also observing that 'there 
was plenty of money to be made on advising on acquisitions'. 
64 The Issuing Houses Association and the Accepting Houses Association.  
65 See generally Armour & Skeel, supra note 47. 
66 See supra notes 24-26 and infra note 73. 
67 Sir Leslie warns on the Takeover Code, (16 August, 1968) THE GUARDIAN. A different metaphor used in 
relation to the Bank of England was the Bank as 'parent'.  Harry Siepmann, Lazards: 'faith in the Bank as 
the Leader and Parent of the City […]' (KYNASTON,  supra note 10, 57). 
68 Importantly the Bank of England was also strongly incentivised to ensure City co-ordination as any 
state interference in this zone would have represented a significant loss of authority, at a time when its 
authority was increasingly being questioned. See, generally, KYNASTON supra note 10, Chapter 6. 
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is necessarily the case where self-regulation responds to state governance failures – 
this financial advisor co-ordinating mechanism is unlikely to be triggered.69   
Of course other market actors could also be incentivised to perform the co-
ordinating role, even if no other constituency is as central to the deal process as 
the financial advisor. In an important article addressing the UK takeover context, 
Professors Armour and Skeel identify institutional shareholders as a co-ordinating 
mechanism. For Armour and Skeel, the increasing presence of institutional 
shareholders in the UK market place in the 1950s and 60s70 meant that it was in 
their interests to drive the market’s response to exert influence over rule-choice 
even where it may not have been in individual institutions interests to co-ordinate 
to monitor individual companies.71 In theory, with their increasing presence and 
power it seems very plausible that institutions could perform the role of self-
regulatory co-ordinator in order to generate rules that favour their long term 
interests. It would follow that the increasing institutionalisation of corporate 
ownership in a jurisdiction may lead to an increase in the probability that self-
regulatory solutions to corporate problems, will arise where the regulatory space 
has not already been occupied by the state. In this regard, Armour and Skeel 
suggest that: 
 
It is not surprising that the emergence of a pro-shareholder approach to 
takeover regulation coincided with the emergence of institutional investors as 
a significant force in British share ownership. 
 
With regard to the UK, Armour and Skeel are clearly correct that the ‘emergence 
of institutional investors’ played a key role in creating the conditions within which 
the self-regulation of takeovers could arise. However, in my view this is not 
because the institutions themselves co-ordinated to claim the regulatory space. In 
the rule production process their role is better characterised as the interested 
observer rather than the coordinator of the process. Several considerations point 
in this direction. First, it is not clear that either at the end of the 1950s or the 
1960s that intra-institution co-ordinating mechanisms were in place.72 Secondly, 
while it is correct that institutions expressed dissatisfaction at some pre-Takeover 
Code events,73 in relation to several others they were the beneficiaries of practices 
                                                     
69 For a more detailed account of how state expectation and the Bank of England resolved this 
investment banking compliance prisoners dilemma in the post-Notes period as well as a more detailed 
analysis of the substantive responses and how such responses connected to existing corporate law, and 
the interests of varying constituencies see KERSHAW, supra note 16.  
70 Armour & Skeel, supra note 47 at 1767-1772. 
71 They view the Takeover Code as a 'good example' of 'the observed strategy […] of coordinated 
lobbying for rules that were expected to maximise the joint welfare of institutional shareholders' id. at 
1771. 
72 Welcome for a new initiative (20 July, 1967) THE TIMES observing that 'It might be a useful long stop if the 
insurance companies, investments trusts, pension funds and unit trusts all formed a protection committee 
to look after those interests which they have in common. Such body would have a formidable influence'. 
73 For example, Edwin Herbert of The Industrial and General Trust, and later a representative on the 
Notes Working Group, observed in the wake of British Aluminium that 'where a change of control of a 
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– at the expense of retail investors - that appeared to be in breach of the Notes.74 
Although, as is the case with merchant bankers, one could make a case that 
regulation was in the long term interests of institutions even if they were tempted 
to take the low hanging value fruit associated with preferential non-compliance. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, it seems clear from the historical record that 
merchant banks controlled the drafting of both the Notes and the Code75 through 
the Issuing Houses Association, producing a Code that responded to the high 
profile takeover events that led to the Code whilst bonding takeover process to a 
financial advisory role.76 It is submitted that the more significant contribution of 
the institutionalisation of share ownership to takeover regulation in the UK was 
then an indirect one: its demand side contribution to the diffusion of share 
ownership created the conditions for the proliferation of hostile activity which, as 
observed above, altered the business model for investment bankers and generated 
strong incentives for them to take control of the regulatory process when action 
was co-ordinated by the Bank of England.   
  
3. ENFORCEMENT 
 
In the UK, unanimous constituency sign-up for the project was not only necessary 
for the project's momentum, it was central to its mode of enforcement. During the 
lifetime of the Code the Takeover Panel has acquired several state enforcement 
supports through the capital markets regulator prior to 2005 and after 2005 when 
the Takeover Panel became a state supervisory authority, through the courts.77 But 
it has never, and is unlikely ever, to use them. It continues to rely on the 
enforcement tools introduced at its inception which involves neither injunctions 
nor fines but the corporate law equivalent of the naughty step and being sent to 
your bedroom.   
There are three tiers of Panel sanction that ensure compliance with the Code 
and the Panel’s instructions. Such instructions could include a direction to comply 
with the Code or, much more rarely, to compensate parties who are injured as a 
result of non-compliance. The sanction regime provides for a pyramid of 
increasingly onerous sanctions which  fall clearly within the responsive regulation 
umbrella:78 failing to comply with the Code could result in a private censure, a 
                                                                                                                                       
company is envisaged, or where the nature of the company's business is to be changed, shareholders 
should first be consulted' - Watney Sears Silence (12 June, 1959) FINANCIAL TIMES.  
74 Several bids that contributed to the view that regulatory action was necessary gave institutional 
investors preferential price treatment.  See, for example: RTB wins control of Whiteheads (2 February, 1963) 
FINANCIAL TIMES noting that "the dealings in Whitehead shares aroused criticism in the Stock Exchange 
because different treatment was being accorded to different sellers"; Behind the scenes of the Wilkinson & 
Riddell Battle (29 June 1967) FINANCIAL TIMES; Aberdare wins MI battle: Call for Inquiry (13 July, 1967) 
FINANCIAL TIMES. 
75 See The men behind the Code (27 March, 1968) FINANCIAL TIMES.  
76 See II.B.4 below detailing this bonding.  
77 Sections 952-956 Companies Act 2006. 
78 See BALDWIN ET AL, supra note 2. 
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public censure or a 'cold shoulder'. The censures are really precursors / warning 
signs for cold shouldering and involve either a private or public dressing down. If 
parties continue to offend or the first offence is an egregious one then the Panel 
may issue a cold shoulder statement. The effect of a cold-shoulder statement is to 
inform all market participants that they cannot work with this person for the 
specified period of time in relation to a UK takeover. In the early years following 
the Panel’s formation, all the trade associations, together with the Board of Trade 
in relation to licensed dealers, agreed that any of their members who dealt with 
such a cold shouldered person would be subject to trade association sanctions 
which could result, in theory, in an effective loss of licence for many of these 
participants. Today, the cold shoulder statement benefits directly from state 
support through the Financial Conduct Authority's Market Conduct Rules that 
provide that any person authorised to provide financial services business by the 
FCA must cease to work with the specified person in relation to takeovers and if 
they fail to do so may be sanctioned by the FCA, which again risks loss of 
licence.79 However, given the widespread compliance with the Code prior to this 
state support, it appears that the sanction worked effectively without it. 
 It is noteworthy that although this enforcement approach is widely 
considered to be highly effective, there are few public examples of sanctions being 
deployed. Although public censures do occur they are relatively rare. There has 
only been one in the past five years.80 And cold shouldering orders are extremely 
rare. In the history of the Panel there have only been two. The last one was issued 
in 2010,81 but this was the first one for almost twenty years.82 It is common, and 
sensible, in corporate governance scholarship to draw conclusions about the 
probability of enforcement from evidence about the number of enforcement 
actions brought against market participants. Through the lens of the regularity of 
enforcement action by the Panel one might conclude that the probability of Code 
enforcement is low. This would be a serious error of judgment for any market 
participant. However, it is only a mistake that an outsider would make. The Panel 
signals a high probability of enforcement for breach through its close engagement 
with the bid. For every deal the Panel appoints a case officer who is, purportedly, 
available in real time 24/7. This provides an unrivalled  level of interaction with, 
and oversight and control of, each deal.83 The Panel's approach is not unfairly 
characterised as a surveillance culture with deal participants aware of the Panel's 
presence and oversight throughout the deal.  
                                                     
79 FCA Handbook, Market Conduct Rule 4. 
80 For a more detailed analysis of the number of public censures see KERSHAW, supra note 15 , chapter 4. 
81 Hearing Committee Decision in the case of Principal Capital Investment Trust Plc, [164]. The order 
was made for a three year period.  
82 The first cold shoulder was made in 1992 and  arose in relation to purchases of shares in Dundee 
Football Club Plc. This cold-shoulder order was made for an unlimited duration. 
83 For empirical detail on the number of companies with whom the Panel engages each year see John 
Armour et al, Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the 
United States 6 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 687, at 717-718 (2009). 
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Empirical evidence to support this account of such a surveillance culture is 
not available. However a recent case provides some more-than-anecdotal support 
for the this position. Re Expro International Group Plc84 involved an idiosyncratic UK 
deal structure known as a scheme of arrangement.85 A scheme is a court controlled 
deal structure that can be used to effect a merger or the functional equivalent of a 
tender offer.86 To affect a scheme the parties must obtain the required approvals 
from shareholders but also court approval that the scheme is fair and reasonable. 
This case  involved a deal between Expro and a bidder called Umbrellastream. The 
parties agreed terms and obtained the scheme approvals. However, at the same 
time there was what UK M&A lawyers would call a virtual bid. In the shadows, 
Halliburton was lurking indicating that it might make an offer but never quite 
doing so. In such circumstances, the UK Takeover Code provides for a 'put-up-
or-shut-up' rule that requires such virtual bidders to either a make a bid (put-up) 
or announce that it will not make one (shut-up).87 If the bidder elects not to make 
a bid it cannot make an offer for the company in the following six months.88 
However, when a bidder elects to 'shut-up' it can condition its election on certain 
events which if they occur will allow it to re-enter the fray.89  In this case 
Halliburton elected to 'shut-up' subject to the condition that if the court did not 
approve of the Umbrellastream scheme then it would be able to make a bid. The 
possibility of a bidding war for the target incentivised several hedge funds to 
oppose the application for the court's approval of the scheme. Halliburton 
instructed counsel to attend the scheme hearing. More interestingly, for our 
purposes, so did the Takeover Panel. What the Panel was doing at the hearing is at 
first blush rather unclear. Although the Takeover Code applies to schemes of 
arrangement, it had no role in the court's determination of whether or not to 
approve the scheme. The Code was not relevant to the outcome of the scheme. 
Nor was there any no scope for the court to opine on Code rules; and its 
judgment would not affect the application of the Code to the scheme. What then 
was the Panel doing instructing expensive counsel to attend the meeting? It was 
there to make Halliburton aware that it was there. To ensure that Halliburton did 
not say anything at all that could be in breach of its shut-up election. Any 
indication of a particular price or encouragement to create space for a bid would 
have been, in the Panel's view, a breach of the Code. The Panel's presence was 
designed to ensure that Halliburton was aware of this.         
The nature of this command and control compliance culture is difficult to 
describe and, as noted, it has not been empirically documented. The above 
                                                     
84 [2010] 2 BCLC 514. 
85 Part 26 Companies Act 2006. 
86 A reduction and cancellation scheme involves the cancellation of existing shares in exchange for the 
deal consideration and then an issue of new shares to the bidder. See, Jenny Payne, SCHEMES OF 
ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (2014). 
87 Rule 2.6 Takeover Code. 
88 Rule 2.8, Takeover Code. 
89 Note 2 to Rule 2.8 Takeover Code. 
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example merely provides a flavour of it. Moreover, how the culture came into 
being is also undocumented and illusive. It clearly cannot be accounted for by the 
mere existence of a powerful self-regulatory enforcement tool that has rarely been 
used. For a body attempting to replicate the Panel’s success, such self-regulatory 
enforcement arrangements would, and should, appear hopelessly utopian. The 
Brazilian self-regulatory takeover code does not attempt any such replication. 
Indeed it falls far short in this regard with no enforcement mechanism of any 
note.90 Yet in close attention to the Panel’s success there is a key replication 
lesson, although not one that will necessarily be available in the Brazilian context. 
The lesson is that a significant compliance dividend can be obtained, and a culture 
of self-regulatory compliance generated, if key (and co-ordinating) market actors 
can be given a financial stake in the rules and their enforcement. Put differently, 
and discussed in detail below, the key to self-regulatory enforcement success is to, 
through the rules and process, bribe the quarter-back.  
 
4. BRIBING THE QUARTERBACK: CREATING SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL 
STAKES IN COMPLIANCE 
 
For lawyers who encounter the Takeover Code in action for the first time it often 
involves a sense of surprise, if not disappointment. The reason for this is that the 
lawyers are not firmly in charge of what is a very law-like and detailed rules-based91 
document. As the Code makes clear, it is the company's financial advisors that 
bear 'a particular responsibility' for ensuring that their clients comply with the 
Code.92 As a consequence of this, it is financial advisers (as well as lawyers) that 
perform a legal function for their clients. In meetings to discuss deal structure and 
compliance with the Code clients often turn to their bankers to understand how 
the Code works and to understand the Panel's likely response to any requests that 
are made. Of course, given the central role that bankers played in the drafting of 
the Code and the creation of the Panel this is unsurprising. 
Accordingly, UK investment bankers have valuable human capital wrapped 
up in their ability to interpret the Code and to predict Panel judgments. Such 
individual and firm investments are enhanced by the secondee case officer system 
that the Panel deploys. According to this system, the Panel staffs itself, in addition 
to its limited full time staff, with secondees from financial advisors (including 
investment banks and financial consulting firms) and other members of the City 
establishment (including lawyers). In addition, at several junctures in the Code the 
role of financial adviser is hardwired into the takeover process. For example, a 
bidder cannot announce his intention to make a firm offer that will include a cash 
component without a 'cash confirmation statement' from the financial adviser 
                                                     
90 The CAF Code provides for private censure, public censure and then 'withdrawal of the Panel seal', i.e., 
no longer being part of the CAF system (after a one year exit period) - Article 136 CAF Code. 
91 Although the Code purports to be a form of principles based regulations, in addition to six General 
Principles, there are 300 pages of rules and sub-rules.  
92 Introduction, 3(f) Takeover Code. 
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confirming that the cash resources needed to close the deal are available to the 
bidder.93 Other, of the many, examples in which the Code builds in a role for the 
financial advisor include: the determination of whether or not to make a 'possible 
offer announcement';94 the requirement for certifications from financial advisors 
in relation to profit forecasts;95 and target management post-bid remuneration.96 
As each of these roles and functions generates fee income, the Code becomes a 
source of revenue.   
As compliance with the Code is very clearly in the significant financial 
interests of financial advisors it becomes in the financial interests of the brokers, 
accountants, the lawyers who they instruct and the companies, private equity 
houses, hedge funds who rely on their services. The lesson for effective 
enforcement of self-regulation from the Takeover Code is not only the hands-on 
involvement of the Panel and the innovative informal sanction of the cold 
shoulder mechanism, but also a more straightforward incentive story: self-
regulation will work if you make sure that strict compliance is in the financial 
interests of the most important player in the marketplace.  
By providing one market player with such a key role in the regulatory space 
we might have legitimate public choice concerns that the rules will quickly become 
skewed toward the interests of the advisors and of their clients. A strong case can 
be made that multiple specific examples of such bias, referred to above, can be 
found as well as a case that the exponential proliferation in the rule book is 
connected to financial advisor interests as it increases the scope for advice on 
Code interpretation and thereby solidifying a central role in the takeover process 
for bankers. However, with regard to the core of the Code that regulates bidder 
and target behaviour it seems unlikely that any particular interests would be more 
forcefully transmitted to the Panel than others. Advisors typically work with 
bidders and targets and, therefore, see the advantages and disadvantages of the 
rules from both sides on a regular basis. The investment bank is therefore unlikely 
to become an effective conduit for the interests of a particular constituency in any 
regulatory reform or enforcement process. Of course, if advisors specialise in 
working for particular repeat player clients such as private equity firms then their 
views may become weighted towards their client's regulatory preferences. But 
from the Panel's perspective for every advisor putting forward a pro-bidder view 
there is an advisor putting forward the target's perspective. Accordingly, this 
problem is of limited concern.    
This is different of course than saying that the Takeover Code provides a 
neutral system of rules as between shareholders and managers. It does not. It 
                                                     
93 Rule 2.7 Takeover Code. 
94 Practice Statement No 20: Rule 2 – Secrecy, possible offer announcement and pre-announcement 
responsibilities (2008) refers to the 'particular responsibility of financial advisors for ensuring compliance 
with Rule 2' and that the financial advisors should be in control of drafting the announcement. 
95 Rule 28 Takeover Code. 
96 Rule 16.2 Takeover Code. 
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clearly provides a pro-shareholder rule book. But this rule book is not the product 
of shareholder control over or bias in the rule making process, rather the product 
of the deeper shareholder rights bias in British business culture and company law. 
A bias that generated the different strands of public and political outrage from the 
takeover events in the 1960s, relating to both shareholder sovereignty and equality 
of treatment, to which the banker drafters of the Code directly responded.97   
 
5. DEMARCATING THE REGULATORY SPACE 
 
To operate effectively and ensure compliance with its rules, a self-regulator must 
'own' the regulatory space within which it operates. If it does not do so market 
participants may attempt to subvert its rules by attempting to leverage the role of 
other lawmakers that may lay claim to the regulatory space. A self-regulator 
therefore requires either a regulatory space in which there is no other regulator or 
deference from such regulator. As detailed above, the Takeover Panel when it 
came into being benefited from both.98 The Takeover Code also teaches us that 
the ability of an effective self-regulator to control the regulatory space is not only a 
function of the absence or deference of other regulators and adjudicators, but also 
a function of certain 'keystone' rules that carve out that regulatory space. In the 
case of the Takeover Code there are two such rules: the non-frustration rule and 
the mandatory bid rule. The non-frustration rule is a rule that provides that where 
a bid has commenced or is imminent, target management cannot take any action 
that could prevent the shareholders from deciding on the merits of the bid 
without shareholder approval. This applies regardless of whether or not the board 
has any defensive motivation vis-à-vis the intended corporate action.  As I have 
argued elsewhere99 the actual substantive effect of the non-frustration rule is 
overstated as the existing UK corporate law requires similar, although not 
identical, protection through the proper purpose doctrine.100 However, the non-
frustration rule's limited substantive impact should not be mistaken for its lack of 
importance to the Takeover Panel. In its absence, the question of the availability 
of defences and the effects they could have on bid timing and process would not 
                                                     
97 See note 24, 25 and 26. Elaborating this claim see further KERSHAW, supra note 15, Chapter 3. 
98 Note also that when actions were brought in the courts for judicial review of Panel decisions the courts 
adopted an explicit and extremely deferential stance. They made it clear that although that they had the 
power to intervene – because the Panel, although a self-regulatory body, was performing state functions – 
it would only be in the most egregious of circumstances in which they would intervene. Furthermore, the 
courts clarified that in the very rare event where they deemed intervention to be necessary, if the matter 
related to an ongoing takeover the court's ruling would be historic and not contemporaneous. This meant 
the court's ruling would only apply to future action by the Panel and would not alter the Panel's decision 
in the immediate case - R. v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex p Datafin Plc [1987] QB 815 and R v Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex p Guinness plc [1989] 1 ALL ER 509. 
99 David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition 56 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 267-308 (2007).  
100 The proper purpose doctrine now set forth in section 171(b) of the Companies Act 2006 as the duty 
to use powers for proper purposes prohibits (without ex-ante  or ex-post shareholder approval) the use of 
corporate power to interfere with the fundamental shareholder rights to vote and to decide on whether to 
accept or reject a takeover offer.   
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be in the hands of the Takeover Panel but in the hands of the courts interpreting 
the scope of application of the proper purpose doctrine. The Takeover Panel 
would often be forced to play second fiddle to the courts undermining both its 
autonomy and the perception that it controls the rules of the game in the UK 
takeover market.  
The second 'keystone rule' is the mandatory bid rule. There is of course no 
such thing as a mandatory bid. All mandatory bids under the Takeover Code are 
voluntary bids because the bidder decides voluntarily to cross the mandatory bid 
threshold. It might do so to enhance its ownership position in the target prior to 
the offer if the bidder expects resistance from the target. The rules that apply to 
mandatory bids are more onerous than those that apply to voluntary bids. For 
example, the pricing look-back period for a mandatory bid is twelve months and 
rather than three months101 and there is virtually no scope for any conditionality 
beyond a simple majority acceptance threshold.102 Accordingly, most bidders elect 
for voluntary bids. However, without the mandatory bid rule the Panel would not 
be able to maintain its stringent regulation of voluntary bids as the costs of the 
incremental acquisition of control of the target over time would in many cases be 
lower than a Code controlled voluntary bid. This would force the Panel to reduce 
the costs of voluntary bids by relaxing many of the rules. 
Although both of these rules are contentious, there are many valid arguments 
in their favour.103 However, aside for the arguments for and against the rules, it is 
interesting to observe that the centrality of these rules to the creation and 
operation of self-regulation of the market for corporate control gives the regulator  
a distinct vested interest in these rules that may not be aligned with the interests of 
the companies it regulates or the economy in which those companies operate. 
Accordingly, in relation to such keystone rules the technique of self-regulation 
may bias substantive outcomes in an unexpected way, independently of the rule 
bias sought by constituency interests. It follows that where events problematise 
such rules we cannot rely on the self-regulator – even one that is truly independent 
of constituency interests – to be a neutral arbiter of the suitability and efficiency of 
such keystone rules. 
Recent events in the UK lend support to this view. The high-profile, initially 
hostile, takeover of Cadbury Plc by the US corporation Kraft Inc raised the 
question in political, business and media circles as to whether UK companies were 
too exposed to hostile deals and two easily taken over. At a speech at the SAID 
Business School the outgoing Chairman of Cadbury, Roger Carr, asked whether 
the prevailing takeover rules 'were fair and helpful to the long term success of 
Britain’s future'.104 In this speech, as possible reform responses Mr Carr 
                                                     
101 Rule 9 Takeover Code. 
102 Rule 9 Takeover Code. 
103 See Edmund Schuster, The Mandatory Bid Rule: Efficient, After All? (2013) 76 MODERN LAW REVIEW 
529-563; KERSHAW, supra note 15, Chapter 1. 
104 Speech available: http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/roger-carr-cadbury-hostile-bids-and-takeovers.  
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considered both the disenfranchisement of short term shareholders in hostile bid 
contexts and an increase in the minimum acceptance condition from a simple to a 
super majority. We cannot explore the merits of these proposals here, but what 
should be noted is that both ideas explored ways in which boards could be directly 
or indirectly empowered and supported over the long term. An alternative means 
of altering the balance of power would be to provide boards with greater defensive 
capability which inter alia would involve reform to the non-frustration rule.  
Following Carr’s comments, political and media attention on the role the Code’s 
rules was heightened and the Takeover Panel responded with a consultation 
process and rule changes that, at the margin, may have dampened takeover 
activity.105 For our purposes, what matters here is not whether Carr was right or 
wrong, that matters is that there was no serious engagement in the consultation 
process regarding the merits of the non-frustration rule;106 and no attempt to 
gather empirical evidence on the effects that this rule may have UK companies 
and the UK economy. This key issue was not placed in play at all and the debate 
was ultimately channelled into marginal, if useful, reforms. The keystone rule 
remained untouched.  
 
 
 
IV. MARKET CONTROLLED REGULATION: COMPLY OR 
EXPLAIN 
 
One of the most important governance phenomena of the past 20 years has been 
the introduction of market controlled corporate governance codes designed to 
guide companies towards best practice in the composition and structure of the 
boards. These codes invariably address the number of non-executive directors and 
their role and independence of management; and board committee structure and 
the staffing of these committees. They may also cover separation of the roles of 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; remuneration guidance; and internal 
controls. These Codes are typically  – although as the US experience shows not 
always107 – 'comply or explain' codes. 'Comply or explain' means that companies 
are required to comply with the recommendations set forth within the code or to 
explain to their shareholders why they do not comply. The underlying idea of such 
codes is to set forth guidance on governance best practice that one would expect 
                                                     
105 Including a tightening up of the put-up or shut rule to commence automatically from the first 
announcement (Rule 2.6 Takeover Code) and the prohibition of deal protections (Rule 21.2 Takeover 
Code). See Consultation Paper Issued By the Code Committee of the Panel: Review of Certain Aspects 
of the Regulation of Takeover Bids (PCP 2010/2). 
106 As I have argued elsewhere, a strong case can be made that in fact the non-frustration rule does not 
make a significant difference to exposure levels for UK targets (see Kershaw, supra note 99) however, 
before one could consider altering UK company law to make it more board friendly the non-frustration 
rule would have to be addressed.  
107 Although some composition rules are set forth in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most composition and structure rules are set forth in the governance rules of the 
trading platform, for example, in Section 3.03A of the  NYSE Listing Manual.  
                           5/2015 
 
 30 
most companies to follow but to leave companies the freedom to adapt 
governance rules and structures to their own conditions and circumstances: one 
size does not fit all therefore one size is not imposed on all.  However, departures 
from the code must be justified to shareholders who can assess and respond to the 
non-compliance explanation either through voice or exit. 
In most instances it is difficult to describe these comply or explain codes as 
the products of self-regulation. Although the code rules are typically produced by 
representatives of market actors who are the members of the code committee or 
commission who produce the rules, such commissions invariably have been 
formed by or are connected to the State, members are often appointed by the state 
or the state at least has a say in the broader membership, and typically the 
obligation to comply or explain is set forth in mandatory law. These codes then 
are archetypal examples of market controlled regulation whereby the state seeks to 
achieve its regulatory objective by co-opting the market actors to form and tailor 
the rules. In doing so it takes the risk that control of the rules may bias the rules in 
favour of market actors, in order to obtain the substantive benefits of informed 
and tailed business regulation and the compliance and norm formation benefits 
that may flow from market ownership of the regulatory space. 
 
1. FOUNDATIONS 
 
The first comply and explain corporate governance code was the UK's Code of 
Best Practice issued in 1992, which formed the basis of what today is known as 
the UK Corporate Governance Code. The first iteration of this Code resulted 
from Sir Adrian Cadbury's investigation into the 'Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance'. The 'Cadbury Committee' was – like the Takeover Code and Panel – 
the product of a the combination of a deferential conception of the British State, 
pressure generated by public outrage in relation to several corporate and 
accounting scandals,108 and the co-ordination and forced entry of market 
participants into the 'contracting zone' by the London Stock Exchange and the 
quasi-state body, the Financial Reporting Council, who commissioned the 
Report.109 The Financial Reporting Council (the FRC) itself was then a recently 
formed response to the failed self-regulation of accounting standards.110  After the 
Cadbury Committee’s recommendations were delivered, the FRC became 
responsible for the maintenance and revision of the Code. The FRC is a quasi 
state-body with certain formally designated state functions111 and its Chairman and 
CEO are appointed by the Secretary of State for Business. Nevertheless, this is a 
body controlled by market constituents, with a majority of FRC appointed board 
                                                     
108 See for example, Mr Maxwell’s costly legacy (5 December 1991) FINANCIAL TIMES. 
109 ‘DTI will back in-depth review of Companies’ (May 31 1991) FINANCIAL TIMES. 
110 Sir Ron’s tough package sets standard (10 November 1988) FINANCIAL TIMES.  
111 Part 42 Companies Act 2006. 
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members from the business and accounting worlds and with no delegated 
representatives from other regulators or government.112  
From its inception the Code has been a 'comply or explain' Code. However, 
for companies subject to the Code the requirement either to comply or explain is 
mandatory. Pursuant to the FCA's listing rules, premium listed companies113 must 
either must provide a statement in their annual reports setting forth whether they 
comply with the Code's provisions or explaining their failure to comply.114 The 
Code itself recommends that explanations provide background to, the rational for 
and risks associated with the departure for the Code.115 However, there are no 
clear guidelines in the FCA's rules on the level of detail that must be provided in 
company's explanations of non-compliance. A statement providing that 'the 
provision is unsuitable for our company' would appear to suffice for the purposes 
of compliance with the explain obligation. It is noteworthy that in this regard the 
FRC has no sanctioning powers, and that to-date there has been no action by the 
FCA or its predecessor, the Financial Services Authority, in relation to companies 
failure either to explain or in relation to the quality and detail of the explanation.  
Worldwide at the beginning of this century there was an exponential increase 
in the production of Corporate Governance Commissions and Codes following 
multiple high profile corporate and audit failures, particularly in the United 
States.116 Although the governance response in the United States generated 
mandatory rules imposed through exchanges and trading platforms,117 most other 
jurisdictions elected for the less intrusive comply or explain approach. In 
Germany, for example, a Corporate Governance Commission was appointed by 
the Federal Government in 2001 and a Code introduced in 2002.118 Publicly 
traded companies are required to either comply or explain non-compliance 
pursuant to section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Law. Although the 
German state provided for its formation, the Commission is staffed (by 
Government appointment) with shareholder and management representatives as 
well as auditors and academics. The Austrian and Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code adopt a similar approach of state authorised commissions and statutory 
                                                     
112 For current board membership see: https://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/FRC-structure/FRC-
Board/Members.aspx. 
113 Companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock exchange may elect to have a premium or 
standard listing. Premium listed companies are subject to more onerous listing and governance 
requirements.  
114 Listing Rule 9.8.6(5). 
115 UK Corporate Governance Code, [3]. 
116 Including, most notably, the failures of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco. 
117 See, for example, Section 3.03A of the  NYSE Listing Manual for corporations listed on the NYSE. 
118 Note that the stimulus to create a Corporate Governance Code was pre-Enron with a Code generated 
by academics in 1999 and the Commission appointed prior to Enron’s collapse in September 2000 – See 
Eddy Wymeersch, Corporate Governance Codes and their Implementation 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931100). 
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comply and explain obligations coupled with Commissions staffed by market 
participants.119   
  
2. COMPLIANCE LEVELS 
 
The typical expectation of students who encounter the 'comply or explain' idea for 
the first time is that compliance levels will be low. We tend to think of regulation, 
particularly regulation that represents a response to failings, as directing 
participants to take actions contrary to their preferences. It follows that if you give 
the regulated a choice about compliance then they will elect not to comply. This 
concern was acknowledged by the Cadbury Committee  which warned market 
participants that if they did not take the recommendations seriously 'it is probable 
that legislation and external regulation will be sought to deal with some of the 
underlying problems'.120 Yet contrary to this expectation, compliance levels for 
comply and explain codes are high, and very high amongst large, publicly traded 
companies. In the UK, Arcot and Bruno121 report compliance levels of between 
85% to 95% of companies in relation to a subset of key – arguably the most 
important – Code provisions.122 Arcot and Bruno did note, however, that where 
there was non-compliance, the relevant explanation was often very brief and 
uninformative.123 Over the course of the Code’s lifespan Arcot and Bruno’s results 
confirm that the UK Code is driving profound structural governance changes, 
even where those changes are contentious. Consider, for example, the 
recommendation to separate the roles of chairman and CEO,124 an issue which 
continues to divide opinion both within the UK and across jurisdictions. Between 
1991-1993 Conyon documents an increase in separation rates from 48%-64%.125 
Arcot and Bruno find that by 2003 the compliance rate had increased to 92%.  
Another example of how the Code appears to be driving change is in relation to 
the length of senior management’s service contracts. As of 2003 Arcot and Bruno 
find weak compliance levels in relation to the Code provision recommending 
maximum one year service contracts. Several years after their study, this is a 
provision in relation to which one would struggle today to find any companies that 
do not comply with this provision. In a later study, with a smaller sample but a 
broader assessment of compliance with all (at the time) 48 Code provisions, Seidl, 
                                                     
119 In Austria the comply or explain obligation was made mandatory pursuant to the Austrian Business 
Code Amendment Act 2008. Pursuant to the Netherlands Civil Code, Dutch companies must comply or 
explain non compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code. 
120 Report of The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), [1.10]. 
121 Sridhar Arcot and Valentina Bruno, In Letter but not in Sprit: An Analysis of Corporate Governance Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=819784.  
122 They code 8 provisions: Chairman/CEO separation, appointment of a SID, number NEDS, % of 
NEDs, service contract terms, nominations committee, remuneration committee and audit committee. 
123 See id. 18-22. 
124 UK Corporate Governance Code, A2.  
125 Martin Conyon & Chris Mallin, A Review of Compliance with Cadbury 22 JOURNAL OF GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT 14 (1997).  
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Sanderson and Roberts found that approximately 63% of the top 80 companies 
(by market capitalization) were fully compliant with the Code whereas only 34% of 
the bottom companies were fully compliant.126 The top 80 companies had an 
average of 0.96 deviations and the bottom 50 an average of 1.49 deviations.  
If one turns to continental European comply or explain Codes compliance 
levels are high, although again the quality of explanations where there is non-
compliance is considered to be poorly informative.127 The German Code makes a 
distinction between recommendation and suggestions. Compliance rates for DAX 
30 companies in relation to recommendations are in the high 90s percentile and 
for suggestions in the high 80s.128 This represents a notable increase on 2006 when 
only 40% of DAX companies were fully compliant and only 10% of MDAX (mid-
cap) companies were in full compliance with the Code.129 Dutch compliance rates 
are high 90s percentile for large caps although compliance rates drop for mid and 
small caps (89%, 88%, respectively).130  
Care needs to be taken, however, in assuming that the existence of a comply 
or explain governance code coupled with high rates of compliance necessarily 
represents a new and distinctive contribution to governance. Many corporate 
governance codes have extensive sections than merely replicate the existing legal 
position as set forth in the applicable Corporate Code. The Austrian Corporate 
Code, for example, explicitly acknowledges that the Code is based on Austrian 
corporate and securities law, as well as OECD Principles.131 The German Code 
contains many provisions that again merely replicate corporate law and practice. 
For example, the German Code contains provisions referring to the unavailability 
of multiple voting rights, which for most companies are unavailable under 
German law.132 Its section on the management board (Vorstand) involves in large 
part a replication of existing mandatory corporate law.133 Furthermore, many of 
the provisions in the Code would not be viewed by many corporate governance 
scholars as governance terms at all rather just good process guidelines. For 
example in Provisions 2.2.4 of the Code there is a suggestion that the general 
                                                     
126 David Seidl, Paul Sanderson & John Roberts, Applying 'Comply or Explain': Conformance with Codes of 
Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany (http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP389.pdf).  
127 This latter concern has led the European Commission to encourage companies to improve the quality 
of explanations. See European Commission Recommendation on the quality of corporate governance 
reporting (2014/208/EU). 
128 See Axel Weder and Jenny Bartz, Corporate Governance Report 2013: Abweichungskultur und 
Unabhaengigkeit im Lichte der Akzeptance und Anwendung des Aktuellen DCGK (available at: 
http://www.bccg.tu-berlin.de/main/publikationen.htm). See also: Paul Davies at al, CORPORATE BOARDS 
IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2013). 
129 See id..  
130 Rapport Monitoring Commission Corporate Governance Code (2012) at  
http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/rapport-2012.  
131See Preamble, Austrian Corporate Governance Code. 
 (http://www.wienerborse.at/corporate/pdf/CG%20Codex%202012_v5_englisch.pdf). .  
132 Provision 2.1.2 German Corporate Governance Code (http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/download/kodex_2013/D_CorGov_final_May_2013.pdf). Multiple voting rights are now 
generally prohibited for the stock corporation in the Stock Corporation Act, s 12(2), and voting caps for 
public companies in s 134(1). 
133 See id. For example, section 4. 
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meeting last for four to six hours. Provision 2.3.3 suggests that that the general 
meeting should be followed by modern communication. Of course, these Codes 
do take important steps to alter certain existing practices. Most importantly in 
relation to the German Code is the recommendation to limit the longstanding 
practice of management board members retiring to the supervisory board134 or the 
provision recommending that supervisory board members do not take more than 
three supervisory board directorships.135 The Code provides both a recommended 
limit on the number of supervisory board members who are former management 
board members and for a cooling off period for managers of two years before they 
are eligible for supervisory board membership. As of 2013, these provisions 
attracted between low 70s and high 90s percentile compliance, with larger 
companies more likely to comply.136 The point here is not that these Codes do 
not, or do not have the potential to, make a governance difference, but that we 
must parse often lengthy codes for provisions that are different from applicable 
corporate law or are of real governance significance. This in turn means that we 
also need to be wary of overall compliance data which details partial compliance 
and percentage deviation from the all Code provisions. There is a risk with this 
data that identified partial compliance represents merely compliance with existing 
mandatory law or non-governance provisions.137    
These caveats aside it remains clear that in relation to a substantial body of 
companies comply or explain governance codes alter the governance rules and 
practices of those companies even though there is no requirement to actually 
comply. In Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, for example, high 80s and 90s 
percentile of the largest publicly traded companies comply fully with the Codes.  
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, for example the UK, excessive compliance is viewed 
as the primary enforcement problem. The FRC has become concerned that 
companies do not take seriously enough the idea that they can explain non-
compliance. Recent amendments to the Code attempt to foreground this option to 
companies.138  The UK's post-crisis Walker Review into the Governance of Banks 
and Financial Institutions lamented the fact that many of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code's rules may be inapt for banks yet banks did not opt out and 
explain non-compliance.139 Walker was particular concerned in this regard that the 
Code’s focus on the independence of non-executive directors resulted in boards of 
banks staffed with directors who did not understand modern banking and 
                                                     
134 See id. 5.4 
135 See id. 5.4.5 
136 See Weder & Bartz supra note 128 at 890. 
137 See, for example, Seidl supra note 126.  See Weder & Bartz supra note 128 separating out the existing 
mandatory law but not the non-governance like / business practice provisions from the overall 
compliance levels – but importantly providing provision level compliance information.  
138 UK Corporate Governance Code, Comply or Explain, 4.  
139 A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities (2009) 
Observing at [2.16] that some shareholder 'appear to have interpreted [comply or explain] in a somewhat 
minatory way as "comply or else"'. 
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financial services.140 Whether or not this was the case across all UK banks is 
debatable,141 but Walker was surely correct that UK banks did not consider that 
they had space to explain non-compliance. This has led some commentators 
(unsuccessfully) to propose changing the terminology to 'apply and explain'.142 The 
idea being that companies need to distance themselves from a 'compliance culture' 
and that using 'apply' instead of 'comply' will enable this.143   
 
3. ENFORCEMENT DRIVERS 
 
These Codes make recommendations many of which are not in the senior 
managers’ interests. Separation of Chairman and CEO in the UK and 
management board cooling off periods in Germany are good examples of such 
managerially unfriendly rules. Such rules are not enforced by regulators. There are 
no direct financial consequences of non-compliance. Yet the compliance levels are 
very high. What explains this? Where do we find the compliance pressures? 
It seems clear that the compliance pressure arises through a combination of 
market/investor expectation about good governance as benchmarked by the 
applicable Code coupled with reputational capital concerns for managers but also, 
more importantly, for non-executive directors whose rents are a function of their 
ability to obtain other (parallel or subsequent) non-executive positions. This 
reputational capital is. inter alia, a function of directors’ association with companies 
that are known for good and not bad governance practices. The potential 
reputational downside of non-compliance for directors is a function of the 
likelihood that investors (fund managers) will reject the explanation and put their 
head above the parapet to complain about non-compliance and 'bad governance'. 
The question of importance here is: what factors determine an investor’s response 
to explained non-compliance? 
Ideally, such a response is a function of the arguments about the benefits and 
downsides of the provision itself and the provision’s application to the company 
in question. It may be the case that compliance levels are high because attempts to 
explain non-compliance have met with careful consideration by institutional 
investor and their fund managers but ultimately their rejection of the non-
compliance and subsequent direct and indirect pressure to comply. However, 
there are several factors which may distort such an 'ideal' shareholder assessment 
of non-compliance. First, consider the costs associated with that analysis for the 
fund manager. Although the economic benefits for the investor of the company 
                                                     
140 A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: 
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2009) [3.08]-[3.12] 
141 Compare the Board of HBOS in 2006 (little to no knowledge of banking and financial services) with 
the board of the Royal Bank of Scotland (significant financial services experience). See HBOS Annual 
Report and Accounts 2006 (available at: 
 http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/investors/2006/2006_hbos_ra.pdf at 
90) with RBS’s Annual Report and Accounts 2006 (available at: 
http://www.annualreportowl.com/RBS/2006/Annual%20Report) at 101.   
142 See Call for More Flexibility on Code (25 June, 2009) FINANCIAL TIMES. 
143 Note that the King Code of Governance for South Africa adopts an 'apply or explain' approach.  
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complying or not complying with the provision are likely to be very uncertain, 
opaque and distant, the opportunity costs of the governance conversation are clear 
and immediate.  It is cheaper in such circumstances to have a pro-compliance bias 
across all portfolio companies which resists detailed investigation, engagement and 
conversation and relies on the best practice recommendation of the expert market 
regulators. Of course, investors can rely on, and pay for, the advice of governance 
specialists,144 however, such specialists have a deep vested interest in a strong 
compliance culture that keeps governance relevant. This surely gives such advisors 
a pro-compliance bias. Second, many passive fund managers may themselves be 
subject to external pressure to be seen to be acting in order to be seen to be doing 
their job. Such pressure could come from the ultimate investors – e.g., pension 
trustees, but could also come from government. In the UK, for several decades 
the monitoring and activism of shareholders has been on the regulatory agenda. 
Government ministers who have decried the role of shareholders prior to the 
crisis  describing them as 'absentee landlords'.145 Most recently this resulted in the 
introduction of a 'comply or explain' Stewardship Code for investors.146 Fund 
managers sensitive to these pressures and criticisms are aware that they need to be 
seen to be acting, even when they are of the opinion that it is not in their, or  their 
ultimate investors’,  economic interests to invest resources in being more attentive 
and active. Opposing non-compliance with the Corporate Governance Code is 
arguably a very cheap way of being responsive to such external pressures. As Ed 
Rock and Marcel Kahan have recently taught us,147 in each jurisdiction we need to 
understand the symbolism of investor activism which may reveal that the reason 
for acting is very different than the reason given for acting. It seems likely in the 
UK that compliance pressure comes in part from the symbolic capital investors can 
earn by opposing – loudly – non-compliance, regardless of explanations. High 
profile examples of shareholder dissatisfaction with Code non-compliance would 
appear to fit with such an understanding. Consider, for example, the decision in 
2008 by Marks & Spencer Plc, a household name in British retail, not to comply 
with the Code provision recommending separation of the chairman and CEO 
roles. Investors treated the separation rule as a mandatory provision, accusing the 
company of being 'in breach' of the Code, leading one City commentator to 
observe that 'apparently the English word "or" in comply or explain has lost its 
meaning'.148 If this correctly describes investor motivation some of the time for 
objecting to non-compliance, then directors of companies cannot expect a fair 
hearing for their explanations. Furthermore, it seems probable that as soon as one 
                                                     
144 See generally, for example, Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: 
Myth or Realty (2010) 59 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 870. 
145  Different kinds of company ownership are gaining in popularity (10 October, 2011) FINANCIAL TIMES.  
146 UK STEWARDSHIP CODE available at: https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-
governance.aspx.  
147 Marcel Kahan, and Edward B Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics 94 B.U. LAW REV. 1997 (2014). 
148 ‘Why M&S Shareholders should think before we speak’ FINANCIAL TIMES (8 April 2008). 
  
David Kershaw                                                                        Corporate Law and Self-Regulation  
 
 37 
investor publicly complains, other investors will line up to drink at the trough of 
symbolic capital and directors will suffer reputational damage regardless of the 
strength of the justification for non-compliance. The larger and more high profile 
the company the more likely it will trigger a knee jerk 'object and shout loudly' 
response from the investment community. And the more likely that directors will 
comply rather than bother to explain why non-compliance makes sense, even 
when it does. 
 
4. THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY TECHNIQUE ON RULE CHOICE 
 
As noted in the Introduction to this chapter, one of the concerns about delegating 
regulatory authority to the market place is that the regulation will have a pro-
market bias. Is it then surprising that the UK’s market-controlled comply or 
explain Code is much more detailed and demanding, and much more pro-
shareholder than mandatory governance regimes subject to state regulatory 
oversight such as those found in the United States?149 Two familiar explanations 
offer themselves for this variation, but neither are satisfactory. First, that the 
market-controlled rule-making process has been captured by the interests of 
institutional shareholders which have pushed the Code’s shareholder orientation. 
Indeed, it is clearly the case that for the past-two decades institutional investors 
themselves and through their trade associations have exerted a strong public 
governance voice in the UK. However, a case for the overweighting of such direct 
influence is difficult to make when one considers the background of the key 
players of the members of the Cadbury Committee, the membership of the FRC 
or the leading players in governance reform such as Sir Adrian Cadbury and Sir 
Derek Higgs.150 Second, that the Code’s shareholder primacy bias may be an 
extension of, or a reflection of, UK company law’s and legal culture’s established 
shareholder rights orientation.151 Whilst a pro-shareholder legal environment is 
surely an important contextual factor, given the absence of these type of rules until 
the 1990s it is clearly only an ancillary driver.  
The primary driver of this rule detail and rule orientation, it is submitted, is 
the effect of the comply or explain technique itself on the market-controlled 
regulator’s outlook. The market-controlled regulatory bodies charged with drafting 
and amending a comply or explain code will approach their task very differently 
than a body tasked with drafting a set of mandatory governance rules. The latter is 
aware that the rules it selects must be adopted by the subject companies. It is, 
therefore, likely to be highly attuned to the authority/accountability152 trade-offs 
associated with different rule choices and much more wary of changing the rules 
in the face of governance scandals. In contrast, a 'comply or explain' regulator may 
                                                     
149 S.19(b)(1) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requiring SEC approval of self-regulatory organisation rule 
changes following a SEC controlled consultation process. 
150 Both of whom played major roles in UK companies.  
151 See generally, DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2nd eds, 2012). 
152 K. Arrow, ‘The Limits of Organization’ (1974) FELS LECUTURES ON PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 77. 
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feel that she has more room to ignore, or at least be less concerned about, the 
trade-offs and to 'aim high' by providing truly best practice rules. This is because 
in such a regulator’s minds-eye the trade-off, if it needs to be made, can be made 
by the company itself. That is, built into the comply or explain approach is the 
safety value that if the regulator gets it wrong for the company in question the 
company may simply ignore the rule and explain why.  Such an outlook would also 
make a 'comply or explain' regulator more receptive to calls for reviews of, and 
changes to, the rules in the face of public and political pressure to address 
governance scandals. Where comply or explain works as it is designed to such 
responsiveness to accountability pressures and a best practice outlook are not 
problematic. However, if comply or explain malfunctions for the reasons 
discussed above and in effect turns an optional regime into a mandatory regime 
then when combined with such a regulatory outlook  there is a strong case that 
comply or explain is a sub-optimal regulatory technique that is likely to result in a 
regulatory overweighting of accountability concerns.   
 Take, for example, governance rules that determine whether a director is 
independent or not. Very demanding independence rules that provide for no-
business relations with the company or long employee cooling-off periods will 
exclude many individuals with the right skills and knowledge to perform the 
directorial role effectively: to exercise the managerial function and to bring 
industry relevant experience, contacts and networks to bear. There is a trade-off 
between tight independence rules and the pool of knowledgeable directors: the 
tighter the rules, the shallower the available pool of directors. A trade-off that has 
been brought to light by the financial crisis.  A comply or explain regulator may be 
more likely to select demanding rules that take independence seriously because she 
knows that if the rules are not suitable the company can elect not to comply with 
the independent non-executive recommendation and to appoint a non-
independent but knowledgeable director. In an optional comply or explain 
environment there is, in theory, no demarcated pool of talent because companies 
can dip into the non-independent pool. In contrast, in a mandatory rule 
environment, as is the case for example with corporations listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange,153 there is no option not to comply with the 50% independent 
non-executive director requirement and appoint the non-independent 
knowledgeable director. In such a mandatory environment the regulator will be 
acutely aware of the need to ensure that the definition of independence does not 
cut off the supply to the talent pool. However, if in a comply or explain 
environment companies experience the rules as mandatory rules then companies 
are faced with the same predicament as companies in the mandatory regime but 
with a regulator who thinks that the regime’s non-compliance flexibility gives it 
more room to set rules that represent ideal standards.  Of course a regulator could 
adjust its approach to rule-making to take account of an over-compliance culture. 
                                                     
153 NYSE Listing Manual, 303A.01 and A.02. 
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However, such over-compliance with a rule may equally be viewed by the 
regulator as the broad affirmation of its rule-making choices. When faced with 
interpretations of empirical facts that challenge or affirm our identities and roles, 
invariable people select the interpretation which defensively affirms their identity 
and their prior actions.154  It is, therefore, improbable that one would see such an 
adjustment by a 'comply or explain' regulator to its rule-making outlook.   
It is problematic to attribute jurisdictional variation to any particular driver. 
There are likely to be many drivers of variation. It is submitted however that a 
comparison of the UK corporate Governance Code with the US rules as set forth, 
for example, in the NYSE Listing Rules, raises concerns that the above sub-
optimality problem is present in the UK. Both jurisdictions have a 50% 
independent non-executive director requirement.155 However, the independence 
definition is much more demanding in the UK than in the US. The UK has, for 
example, a cooling off period of five rather than three years under the NYSE 
rules.156 In the UK any performance based pay for independent directors renders 
them presumptively non-independent,157 as does nine years continuous service; the 
NYSE rules contain no such limitations.158  It is of course empirically very difficult 
/ impossible to assess whether such rules are resulting in the staffing of UK 
boards with independent but unknowledgeable directors. The consequences of 
this being the case are reason enough to consider whether the UK should step 
back from governance leadership. It may also be a salient lesson that there is 
always a darker side to every governance innovation and that in practice we may 
find that regulatory theory – such as the probable bias associated with the 
delegating regulatory power to the regulated – may be significantly wide of the 
mark.  
 
5. CULTURAL GOVERNANCE BEYOND THE TICKED-BOX 
 
A traditional view of self-regulation focuses on the creation of law-like rules 
produced by market actors. More contemporary ideas of how to get the market to 
self-regulate focus less on enabling market actors to create and enforce rules 
applicable to all market actors, and more on facilitating pro-regulation norm 
formation within the players themselves: within the cultures of the firms and 
within the heads and identities of their managers and employees.  If successful, 
this is true self-regulation in the literal meaning of the term and external rules, 
whether state- or market-controlled, become far less important as internal firm 
norms ensure targeted behaviours. This approach to regulation has multiple 
                                                     
154 See generally,  C.M. Steele, ‘The psychology of self-affirmation: sustaining the integrity of the self’ IN L 
BERKOWITZ (EDS) ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1988) 261; G.L. Cohen and D.K. 
Sherman, The Psychology of Change: Self-Affirmation and Social Psychological Intervention’ (2014) 65 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 333. 
155 NYSE Listing Manual, 303A.01; UK Corporate Governance Code, B.1.2. 
156 UK Corporate Governance Code, B.1.1; NYSE Listing Manual, 303A.02(b)(i). 
157 UK Corporate Governance Code, B.1.1. 
158 UK Corporate Governance Code, B.1.1. 
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academic labels, including meta-regulation,159 principles-based regulation160 and 
process-based regulation.161 The idea is that the regulator sets forth broad 
objectives and then requires the regulated firms to explore processes and 
procedures to enable those goals to be realised.162 This both utilises local 
knowledge to provide tailored firm-level regulation but also creates conversations 
and processes that bias local norm formation.163 Several factors contribute to the 
likely success of this regulatory strategy that we cannot explore in detail here. First, 
and most importantly, clear and credible buy-in by senior management and the 
board which drives internal (firm-level) enforcement of failures to engage with the 
processes.164 Secondly, the subject firms’ incentives, in particular, but not only, 
those of senior management, must not be demonstrably non-aligned with the 
regulatory objectives.165  
While increasingly this strategy is being used in the regulation of corporate 
activity, it has not featured significantly in corporate law. One area where it is 
deployed in is in relation to board performance. Again we see the UK as market 
leader in the use of this innovation. Whether this is connected to a traditional 
deference to market-solutions which remains embedded in the UK’s regulatory 
psyche is clearly plausible, although speculative. The FRC has become increasingly 
aware that ticking several board composition and structure boxes provided by 
comply or explain codes may not necessarily drive improved performance in the 
board room. In this regard a key, if innocuous, change in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code in 2010 provided that boards must undertake a 'formal and 
rigorous' annual evaluation of their performance. As per the process-based 
regulation tool-kit, the FRC also provides a non-binding set of objectives and 
guidance on both board effectiveness and the effectiveness of the different 
directors including the CEO and CFO, the chairman of the board, the lead 
independent non-executive director (known as a senior independent director) and more 
                                                     
159 Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW. 33 (D. MCBARNET 
ET AL., EDS., 2007). 
160 Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS L. J. 425 (2008) 
(identifying cultural change as one of the potential advantages of this type of regulation,which she labels 
principles-based regulation). 
161 Dan Awrey, William Blair and David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is there a Role for Culture and 
Ethics in Financial Regulation 38 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 191 (2013). 
162 See for example, the UK Financial Services Authority’s ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ initiative: See FSA, 
Treating Customers Fairly, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/doing/regulated/tcf. 
163 This view finds support in both organisational and sociological theory. See, e.g.,  Susan Silbey et al., 
‘The Sociological Citizen’ Relational Independence in Law and Organizations, 59 L'ANNEE 
SOCIOLOGIQUE 201, 218 (2009) (describing a case study in which project engagement resulted in a 
“perceptual and moral transformation”); see also Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward and 
Interpretative Theory of Culture’, in INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3 (1975) 
(observing that 'it is through the flow of behaviour – or more precisely social action – that cultural forms 
find articulation'). 
164 Sharon Gilad, Institutionalising Fairness in Financial Markets: Overcoming Resistance, 5 REGULATION & 
GOVERNANCE 309 (2011).   
165 Awrey et al supra note 161. 
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generally in relation to executive and non-executive directors. This guidance states, 
for example, that 'effective boards' provide direction for management, 
demonstrate ethical leadership and make well informed and high quality 
decisions.166 Importantly, the Code both builds in senior board responsibility for 
this evaluation – by requiring the Chairman of the board to act on the results - and 
provides the means of imposing discipline on this evaluation process through: an 
annual report to shareholders on the evaluation; performance evaluation of the 
chairman led by the senior independent director; and a tri-annual facilitation of 
this performance review through an external facilitator.167  
The effects of this process-based approach remain invisible to external 
scrutiny, which renders it unstable in the face of high profile failure. However, in 
contrast to other areas of regulation where this technique is deployed168 there are 
good reasons to be optimistic about its effects. The board, and in particular, the 
non-executive directors and the chairman have strong incentives to take, and to be 
seen to be taking, board performance and evaluation seriously. Failure to do so 
puts at risk their reputational capital.      
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
A typical caricature of self- or market-controlled regulation is that it serves the 
needs only of the regulated constituencies by producing rules that purport but fail 
to really address the problems that require regulatory attention, and which are 
rarely enforced against their 'kin'. We see from the examples of self- and market-
controlled regulation in the UK discussed in this chapter that, paradoxically, this is 
palpably not the case in corporate law. In the context of both takeover regulation 
and corporate governance codes we find rule overload and rigorous enforcement. 
Do these examples then provide model forms of regulation that other jurisdictions 
would be well advised to emulate? Has corporate law missed a trick in failing to 
employ more broadly such regulatory devices? The analysis in this chapter 
suggests that there is significant doubt that that is the case. The rule-content and 
enforcement overload in both the context of takeovers and comply or explain 
codes appear in part to the product of regulatory malfunction. In relation to 
takeovers such overload may be a function of rent seeking itself – the investment 
banking role, which in the context of enforcement generates a positive regulatory 
dividend but may be a factor in the production of what is now a 300 page Code. 
In the context of comply or explain codes over-enforcement generates a best 
practice, accountability driven code from which opt-outs are in many instances 
                                                     
166 FRC, Guidance on Board Effectiveness (2011), 2 (available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Guidance-on-Board-Effectiveness.pdf).  
167 UK Corporate Governance Code, B.6.2. 
168 For example, in the context of retail financial regulation. See generally, Awrey et al supra note 161. 
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impracticable even though such a best practice outlook is premised on the 
possibility of opt-out. 
The diffusion of market-controlled comply or explain codes shows that such 
innovations are clearly replicable. Any state can direct market actors to produce 
rules and can deploy the process-based tool-kit which we see used in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code’s board evaluation requirement. But in relation to 
endogenous self-regulation where the state does not have a direct role, the analysis 
in this chapter does not hold out significant hope for effective replication where 
market actors – in jurisdictions such as in Brazil today in the takeover context – 
attempt to provide welfare enhancing regulatory solutions where  the state has 
failed to do so. The UK Takeover Panel and Code is in multiple respects a sui 
generis regulatory product. That said the analysis in this chapter suggests that if 
there is one lesson which it offers in the hope of making it work it is 'bribe your 
quarterback': bond the investment banking community to your regulatory product 
by showing them that it can generate income. If successful, it may be that you end 
up with a 300 page code! Maybe the trade-off is worth the candle. 
 
